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VABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to devise an approach to macro-economic 
policy in the reconstruction of the Ugandan economy. The study 
analyses Ugandan economic performance in the major sectors of 
production, the principal markets in the economy and external trade 
and tries to identify the important trends and their cause. A frame­
work, built around the attainment of internal and external balance 
objectives, is designed from which a package of macro-economic policies 
and strategies is derived. The macro-economic policies and strategies 
are classified into three categories: stabilisation, rehabilitation
and development. Stabilisation and rehabilitation are pursued 
concurrently in the short-run while development strategy focuses on 
the long-run. Stabilisation policy is directed at attaining stability 
in the price level, full employment and external balance; rehabilitation 
strategy aims at rebuilding Uganda's production capacity to the 1970 
level where it can support an economic growth rate of at least 6 per 
cent; development strategy aims at boosting the rate of investment in 
order to attain a high rate of economic growth (at least 6 per cent 
per year) with high employment and equity. A long-term strategy of 
macro-economic stabilisation is recommended to support the development
strategy.
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DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
U.Shs.
Bayaye
Uganda shillings. There are 100 units (cents) in one 
Uganda shilling.
1 U.S. dollar = U.Shs.7.47 (March 1980)
Unless otherwise stated, shillings (Shs.) will be used 
for Uganda shillings (U.Shs.)
A Ugandan term used to refer to the urban-unemployed 
ruffians.
Magendo
BPC
CPI
ERSF
A Ugandan term used to refer to the lucrative but illegal 
economic activities characterised by blackmarketeering and 
smuggling.
Budget Priorities Committee
Consumer Price Index
External Revenue Stabilisation Fund
FAO
GATT
GDP
IBRD
ILO
IMF
LDCs
OECD
UN
UNCTAD
Food and Agricultural Organisation 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Gross Domestic Product
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Also known as the World Bank
International Labour Organisation
International Monetary Fund
Less Developed Countries
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
United Nations
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNLF Uganda National Liberation Front
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Uganda has undergone dramatic change in its political, social and 
economic life over the past nine years. On the political scene, President 
Idi Amin and his military regime emerged in a military coup, in 1971, that 
overthrew Obote's civilian government which had ruled Uganda since 
independence. After eight years of political and economic misery under 
the Amin regime, Uganda was liberated by the Tanzanian army assisted by 
Ugandan exiles in April 1979.
The decade of economic prosperity in Uganda, 1960-70, was ruined 
by the following eight-year rule of Amin; this period was characterised by 
very low standards of living emanating from negative economic growth, run­
away inflation with its redistributive evils and a chronic balance of 
payments deficit (Table 1.1). The economic misery was deepened by the 
liberation war and consequent looting which left Uganda in a situation not 
dissimilar to that of Western Europe after the second world war. There 
is now an enormous task of rehabilitation.
This study will focus narrowly on one aspect of this rehabilitation 
the macro-economic policy aspect of the economic rehabilitation. A frame­
work will be set out within which the objectives of internal and external 
balance can be achieved. The aim, therefore, is to set out an appropriate 
framework for analysing the macro-economic stabilisation problems in the 
rehabilitation of the Ugandan economy and to highlight the critical policy
requirements.
21.1 The Ugandan Economy
Uganda is a land-locked country, 240,000 sq.km, in size, 
straddling the equator. Its population, estimated at 13 million in 1979, 
is growing at about 3 per cent a year, and about 93 per cent of the 
population live in rural areas (Helleiner and Belshaw, 1979, p.25). Its 
economy is predominantly agricultural, based largely on coffee, cotton 
and tea as major exports. Agriculture not only provides a livelihood 
for about 90 per cent of the people but also contributes 60 per cent of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) and at least 85 per cent of the country's 
export earnings.
1.2 Economic Performance, 1960-78
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the movements of some important 
economic indicators in the Ugandan economy. From the table, there is a 
very distinct time trend in performance: 1960-70 is characterised by good
economic performance while 1970-78 is characterised by extremely poor 
performance.
The Prosperous Decade, 1960-70
Every economic indicator in the table shows that the decade 
1960-70 was, on average, a prosperous decade. Real GDP at factor cost 
(1966 prices) grew at an average rate of 5.3 per cent a year from Shs.4736 
Million in 1960 to Shs.7268 Million in 1970.^ This record growth compares 
favourably with the 3 per cent of the previous decade, 1950-60. Favourable 
as well is the 2.4 per cent per capita real GDP growth rate per year for 
the decade 1960-70 compared to 0.4 per cent for the previous decade, 1950-60. 
Economic growth during the decade 1960-70 was backed by a substantial
1 In March 1980, 1 U.S.$ = Shs.7.47 (Uganda shillings).
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4investment: in general, total real capital formation never fell below
12 per cent of real GDP (Table 1.2). Food production too was fairly 
good; it. grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 per cent (1 per cent per 
capita growth rate) during the period 1961-70.
TABLE 1.2
TOTAL GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION, IN PURCHASERS'
VALUES IN ABSOLUTE (CURRENT AMD 1970 PRICES) /AND RELATIVE TERMS, 1960-76
(Shs. Million)
Date aGross 
Fixed 
C a p i t a 1 
(Nominal)
Increase*3
in
Stocks 
(Nominal)
Total*3
Gross
Capital
Formation
(Nominal)
C . P . I.
(1970-100)
1 bTotal 
Gross 
Capital 
Formation 
(Real)
bTotal 
Gross 
Capital 
as % of 
Real GDP
1960 538 -56 4 82 66 7 30 12.5
196 3 686 36 72 2 66 1094 21.9
1965 886 -29 857 84 1020 14.3
1969 1188 2 34 1422 91 1563 17.7
19 70 1161 100 1261 100 1261 14.1
19 71 1696 16 171 2 115 1489 16.1
19 72 1315 -77 .1 2 38 111 11J 5 12.0
19 73 1001 61 1062 1.39 764 8. 3
19 74 1571 140 1711 231 74 1 8.0
19 75 1541 171 1712 2 78 616 6.8
1 9 76 1209 322 1531 431 355 3.9
Notes: a Values are in current prices.
b Values are in 1970 prices for capital as well as GDP. For
GDP, the values were changed from 1966 prices in Appendix Table 
6, to 1970 prices.
Source: Computed by author using data from Tabic 2.2, Appendix Table 6,
and UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1978.
5The 5.3 per cent growth rate in GDP during the decade 1960-70
was accompanied by a 3.8 per cent growth rate in exports and a 2.8 per cent
growth rate in imports. The balance of payments picture was also strong:
there were additions to the international reserves at least for the period
1965-70."*“ Prices were reasonably stable; inflation averaged 3.4 per cent
2per year for the period 1960-70.
The prosperity of the decade 1960-70 should not be exaggerated; 
in fact it was only modest. It only becomes spectacular when it is 
compared to the performance of the period 1970-78.
The Decade of Poor Performance, 1970-78
The period 1970-78 showed an extremely poor performance in 
relative and absolute terms: in relative terms, it had the poorest
performance since independence; in absolute terms, growth rates were 
negative in this period. The poor performance can only be appreciated 
after examining Table 1.1. In the period 1970-76, real GDP grew at an 
average rate of -0.3 per cent a year (per capita growth rate of -3.5 per 
cent) compared to 5.3 per cent for the period 1960-70. There is every 
indication that economic growth did not improve in the two years after 
1976 (Chapter 2). The decline in economic growth was backed by a decline 
in investment: in 1976, total real capital formation was 3.9 per cent of
real GDP compared to 17.7 per cent in 1969 (Table 1.2). Food production 
declined as well; it grew at an average rate of 1.2 per cent (-1.7 per cent
1 The period 1961-64 was characterised by deficits in the balance of 
payments. The deficits, however, were caused by the unusually high 
capital outflows rather than a poor performance on the current account; 
the current account had, in fact, substantial surpluses (Table 2.23).
2 The IMF (1979) estimates inflation to have averaged 4.5 per cent per 
year in the period 1960-70.
6per capita growth rate) a year in the period 1970-76 compared to 3.6 
per cent for the period 1961-70. There is no evidence to suggest that 
food production improved in the two years after 1976.
External trade was not sheltered from the general economic 
deterioration: exports grew at an average rate of -5.8 per cent per year 
and imports at -10.6 per cent per year in the period 1970-76. There is 
every indication that export volumes declined even further in the two 
years after 1976 (Chapter 2). However, the export earnings rose from 
Shs.1772 Million in 1970 to Shs.3002 Million in 1976 because of the rise 
in export prices of 129 per cent (Appendix Table 3).^ Nevertheless the 
period recorded very substantial balance of payments deficits during 1971, 
1973 and 1974. Perhaps the most dramatic change was with the price 
level: while inflation averaged 3.4 per cent per year in the period
1960-70, it averaged 105 per cent per year in the period 1971-78.
In brief, the Ugandan economy experienced a negative growth, a 
very unfavourable balance of payments and severe inflation during 1970-78 
in contrast to the period 1960-70 which was characterised by steady 
economic growth, favourable balance of payments and stable prices.
1.3 The Liberation War, Looting and the Ruined Economy
The Liberation War
Tanzania, backed by a small force of Ugandan exiles, invaded 
Uganda at the beginning of November 1978, apparently in response to 
continuous attacks made by Ugandan forces on Tanzania's Kagera salient.
On 11 April, 1979 the capital Kampala was overwhelmed and liberated and
1 The import prices rose even higher with a rise of 188 per cent, causing 
a deterioration in the terms of trade of 20 per cent (Appendix Table 3).
7the entire country occupied by Tanzanian and Uganda National Liberation 
Front (UNLF) forces. The damage inflicted on Uganda's economy by the war 
is well summarised by the Commonwealth team of experts which visited 
Uganda after the war:
"Much of Uganda has indeed been badly damaged by the
fighting...... The battle front moved across the
country from the Tanzanian border, halting temporarily 
near Mbarara, to the frontier with Sudan. Several 
towns were almost completely devastated by artillery 
or aerial bombardment (or a combination of the two).
In others, like Kampala, a proportion of houses, 
factories and public buildings was gutted or partially 
destroyed" (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979a, p.l).
Looting
During and immediately after the war, the breakdown of law and
order opened the way for looting. Its effect on the economy is well
summarised by the Commonwealth team of experts' report:
"After the fighting came looting; at first in 
selective reprisal against the supporters of the 
former regime, then spreading like an epidemic.
The public hospitals lost almost all their beds.
Not only were food, clothes and furniture 
appropriated from shops and houses, and tools 
from workshops; any objects which were immobile 
or valueless to the looters such as laboratory 
equipment, were smashed. Thousands of cars and 
lorries were stolen" (Commonwealth Secretariat,
1979a, p.l).
Stent, a member of the Commonwealth team of experts which visited Uganda 
after the war emphasizes that looting caused more damage than did the war 
itself (1979a, p.13). However, the Commonwealth team reports that the 
war and looting were not the main problem; the problem was the shattered 
economy they succeeded (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979a, p.l).
The Ruined Economy
The economy that the UNLF government inherited was the product
8of the ruins of Amin's economic mismanagement, the destruction by war and
the final destruction by looters. The economic situation is best
described by the Commonwealth team of experts' report:
"There are shops closed or with practically nothing 
to sell, queues, workshops deserted or short of 
equipment, crop land abandoned, pot holes and 
corrugations in the roads, factories without materials 
or machinery. Magendo is widespread.-*- If one 
wants to describe the current scene to somebody who 
has not been there in recent weeks, an obvious 
parallel would be Europe and South East Asia in mid- 
1945" (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979a, p.l).
Inflation was running at 150-200 per cent per year during the period 1971-
79, according to the claims of the UNLF government (Africa Research
2Bulletin, 1979, p.5087c). By March 1979, foreign exchange reserves 
amounted in real terms to only about ten days of imports at 1971 volumes 
(Shs.154 Million); this ran side by side an external debt of Shs.900 
Million - about five times the value of reserves (Helleiner and Belshaw, 
1979, p.34).
1.4 Purpose and Outline of the Study
The immediate challenge posed by the grave economic situation of 
Uganda is the reconstruction of the economy - to put right what has been 
destroyed. One aspect of this challenge requires the formulation of 
appropriate macro-economic policies to support the effort at economic
1 Magendo is a Ugandan slogan used to refer to the lucrative but illegal 
economic activities characterised by black marketeering and smuggling.
2 The estimate of 150-200 per cent of Uganda's inflation is based on 
controlled and blackmarket prices. In fact it is a very rough 
estimation but may not be far from the truth. The inflation figure 
arrived at by the international economic institutions like IMF is about 
105 per bent per year for the period 1971-78. It is this latter 
figure that is used in this study despite its underestimation since it 
uses controlled prices in its computation.
9rehabilitation. The major macro-economic policy objectives which are the 
focus of this study are the achievement of:
(i) adequate economic growth;
(ii) high levels of employment;
(iii) steady expansion of aggregate demand;
(iv) reasonable stability in the price level;
(v) external balance; and
(vi) an equitable distribution of income and 
wealth between persons and regions.
These objectives relate closely to the achievement of adequate economic * 
growth supported by a steady expansion of aggregate demand and an 
equitable distribution of income and wealth between persons and regions.
This study will attempt to suggest the means of attaining the 
above policy objectives through the use of a framework within which the 
objectives of internal and external balance are met. Both theoretical and 
empirical analyses will be used in the development of the argument. The 
main aims of the study are:
(i) to'trace the trends of economic events in Uganda 
up to the point of rehabilitation, and to 
identify the possible causes of these trends;
(ii) to develop a framework, centred on the 
achievement of internal and external balance 
objectives, through which to identify the 
policies and policy measures most appropriate 
for the rehabilitation of the Ugandan economy;
(iii) to specify policy objectives and targets, and 
to make a systematic ranking (where possible)
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of alternative policy measures (and their 
instruments) for each policy objective based 
on realistic criteria; and 
(iv) to draw out the relation of stabilisation
measures to the rehabilitation and development 
of the Ugandan economy.
Chapter 2 traces the trends of economic events in the Ugandan economy up to 
the point of rehabilitation, and explores their possible causes; Chapter 3 
evaluates the internal and external balance theory, sets out a framework 
which is centred on the achievement of internal and external balance 
objectives, and applies this framework to the macro-economic stabilisation 
problems of the Ugandan economy; Chapter 4 uses the framework to derive 
major economic policy measures to achieve the major policy objectives; 
Chapter 5 discusses the stabilisation policy while Chapter 6 relates the 
stabilisation policy to rehabilitation and development strategy; and 
Chapter 7 provides a summary and conclusion of the study.
1.5 Data Availability and Problems
This study uses only secondary data for lack of primary data.
Even so, the quality of the secondary data is not particularly good. The 
production and trade statistics of Uganda hardly go beyond 1976, and their 
quality is questionable for the period 1971-79; for example, official 
statistics exclude blackmarket and smuggling activities which were pre­
dominant in the second half of the decade 1970-80.
The author extracted much information from the report of the 
study conducted by the Commonwealth team of experts on Uganda after the 
Liberation War (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979a, 1979b), and publications
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by International Agencies, namely, FAO, GATT, IBRD, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN and 
UNCTAD.'*’ Some data too have been extracted from Uganda's three five year 
development plans since independence, some ministry annual reports, and 
Uganda's 1971 Statistical Abstract.
In this study, 1970 has been chosen as a basis for time series 
comparisons. This is not to suggest that 1970 was a stable and ideal 
year; however, it was a critical turning point between the prosperous 
decade, 1960-70, and the period 1971-79 of economic mismanagement by the 
Amin regime.
1 The abbreviations are written in full in the Glossary.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DETERIORATION OF UGANDA'S ECONOMY, 1971-79
Whereas the previous chapter provided an introduction to the 
performance of the Ugandan economy in the past two decades, this chapter 
intends to go deeper into the subject but with major emphasis on the 
performance during the period 1970-79. There are three parts to the 
argument. The first part is devoted to the assessment of the principal 
markets in the economy, namely, the money market, the commodity market, 
the foreign exchange market and the labour market.^- The second part 
concentrates on assessing the performance of the major production sectors 
of the economy, namely, the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. 
The third part assesses the performance in external trade through the 
balance of payments account. Finally a summary is provided to link this 
chapter with the next chapter. Throughout, emphasis is laid on tracing 
the trend of economic events and identifying the possible determinants of 
the trend. The product of this analysis is a necessary background to
policy analysis and evolving strategies for economic rehabilitation and 
development in subsequent chapters.
2.1 The Markets
The principal markets in the Ugandan economy are the money market, 
the commodity market, the labour market and the foreign exchange market. 
During the seventies, the money market experienced rapid growth in money 
supply which got transmitted to the commodity market in the form of run-away
1 The bond market is not included in the market analysis because it is 
not yet developed in Uganda.
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inflation; the labour market experienced an excess demand for labour and 
the foreign exchange market an excess demand for foreign exchange.
The Money Market
The money market experienced a radical and rapid growth of money 
supply during the seventies; radical in the sense that the growth of money 
supply diverted substantially from its trend of the sixties, and rapid in 
that it outstripped immensely the growth in economic activities approximated 
by the real rate of economic growth (Table 2.1). Before discussing the 
causes of the growth in money supply, it may be enlightening to recapitulate 
what are thought to be the determinants of the demand for money.
In short, the aggregate demand for money in a country depends on 
the real national income, the level of prices and the yields (expected 
interest rates) on bonds, commodities and capital; this demand function is 
only relevant in a non-inflationary environment. When there is inflation, 
the yields on bonds, capital and commodities no longer influence demand for 
money; instead the expected rate of change of prices (inflationary 
expectations) gains influence as a determinant of money demand. Ex post, 
aggregate demand for money is equal to total money supply.
With respect to the causes of growth of money supply, the factors 
responsible are budget deficits, bank credit and changes in international 
reserves. In the Ugandan case, however, changes in international reserves 
seem to have had no substantial influence on the growth of money supply 
during the sixties and seventies: for example, whereas there were
substantial additions to the reserves during the period 1961-70, and 
drawings on the reserves during the period 1971-79, the growth of money 
supply, narrowly defined as cash plus demand deposits, was steady in the
14
TABLE 2.!.
CAUSES OF CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY, 1961-79
dBudget 
Surplus 
( + ) 
or
Deficit 
(-)
(Million Shs. )
Bank Credit , aChanges
in
Inter­
national
Reserves
(Million 
SDRs)
eMoney Supply
Government 
Borrowing 
From Bank 
of Uganda
(1970=100)
Domestic Bank 
Credit Outstanding
. bValue Index
(Million
Shs.) (1970-100)
C1 a i m s on C1 a i m s o n 
Government Non-
Gove rnm.cn t 
(9 ) (%)
1961 - 14 3.1 -6.7 429 38
1962 - 3 7.3 'S. 6 404 36
1963 - 29.0 11 . 2 44 8 40
19'64 - 1 07.3 5.9 4 72 42
1965 - 2 36.6 -3.6 512 46
1966 - 75.0 -20.9 675 60
1967 - 79.7 o01 758 67
1968 - 288.9 -10.6 895 80
19 69 - 4 2 3.4 -9.8 974 87
19 70 - 4 7 3.3 100 39 61 -3.0 1 12 3 100
19 71 - 951.9 40.1 .1160 103
19 72 - 87 3.7 -8.3 1552 138
19 7 3 - 1284 7.2 2130 190
19 74 - 1145 497 6 5 35 15. i 3010 272
19 75 - 14 37 -0.4 3257 290
19 76 + 1003° -2.0 4497 400
19 77 - 507 -0.5 5788 515
19 78 - 1 313 -12.0 705 3 628
19 79 1921 7 2 28 7807.6 707
(March)
Notes: a Positive signi means a drawing out from the reserve pool while
nogutivo signi means an addition to t ho rear rvi s .
b Computed by author using data from IMF, International Financial 
Statistics; and standardised the results with those of Helleiner 
and Ei c11a i:dson (19 7 9 , Ta b 1 e 26.],). 
c Budget Surplus was possible because.of increased Government 
revenue from the coffee price boom and derived export tax. 
d Financial year starts and ends in Jun< . 
e Narrow money - Cash +■demand deposits.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; IMF,
Surveys of African Economies, Vol.2, 1969; ileHeiner and Richardson 
(1979, Table 26.1); UN, Economic Commission for Africa; Summaries 
cd Economic Data - Uganda, various issues; '-d caurdson (1979a, Tab! e 
27.1); IMF, Balance of Payments, various issues.
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former but rapid in the latter period (Table 2.1); had the changes in 
international reserves been substantially influential, then the growth 
behaviour of money supply would have been the opposite. This then leaves 
bank credit creation and central bank-financed budget deficits to have been 
the principal determinants of the growth in money supply during the sixties 
and seventies. Can the cause of growth of money supply, in the Ugandan 
case, be pinned to one factor?
The main interest here in investigating the causes of growth in 
money supply is to find the factor or factors which caused the rapid growth 
in Uganda's money supply during the seventies; after all, money supply 
during the sixties grew at a rate commensurate with the real rate of 
growth of economic activities while it immensely outstripped the growth in 
economic activities during the seventies.“*" Hence the seventies provide a 
purposeful and ideal period for examining the causes of growth in money 
supply.
The examination of individual contributions of budget deficits
and bank credit creation to the rapid growth of money supply during the
seventies may require the scrutiny of the information contained in Table 2.1.
With reference to the table, it can be observed that government borrowing
from the banking system outstripped private borrowing from the same source:
government borrowing from the banking system as a percentage of total
domestic credit increased from 39 per cent in 1970 to 72 per cent in March
1979; that is, private borrowing from the banking system was only 28 per
cent of the total borrowing in March 1979 compared to 61 per cent in 1970.
1 In the period 1961-70, money supply grew at an average rate of 6.2 per 
cent per year compared to the 5.3 per cent per year average growth rate 
of real GDP for approximately the same period (1960-70); however, in 
the period 1971-79, money supply grew at an average rate of 76 per cent 
per year compared to the -0.3 per cent per year average growth rate of 
real GDP for roughly the same period (1970-76) (Table 2.1).
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Moreover, most of government borrowings were secured from the central bank 
through ways and means advances which accumulated from Shs.205 Million in 
1972/73 to Shs.5275 Million (more than 60 per cent of real GDP of 1976) in 
1978/79 (Table 2.3). The borrowed money was used to finance budget 
deficits which accumulated from Shs.1405 Million in 1972/73 to Shs.6088 
Million (about 75 per cent of 1976 real GDP) in 1978/79, representing an 
average growth rate of 67 per cent per year (Table 2.3).^ The increase of 
1821 per cent in government borrowings from the central bank from 1970 to 
March 1979 (Table 2.1) leaves no doubt that the government's expansionary 
fiscal policy was chiefly responsible for the 1971-79 rapid growth of money 
supply.
Another important investigation that is worth undertaking is 
whether the rapid growth in money supply had any significant effect on the 
price level; or to put it differently, can Uganda's inflation of the 
seventies be explained by the rapid growth of money supply? The money- 
prices relationship established in the Cambridge version of the Quantity 
Theory of Money could provide an a priori hypothesis for the investigation. 
It says:
M = K.Y.P. (2.1)
where M 
P 
Y 
K
nominal money 
the price level 
real income
a constant (the reciprocal of the velocity of 
circulation of money)
1 The growth of government spending and its allocation between capital
and recurrent spending for the period 1961-79 are presented in Appendix 
Table 1.
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TABLE 2.2
MONEY SUPPLY AND PRICE LEVEL, 1960- 70
Money , cSupply Price Index*3
Value , a Index Change Index Change
in in
Index Index
(Million Shs.) (1970=100) (1970=100)
1960 437 39 n.a. 66 n.a.
1961 429 38 -1 60 -6
1962 404 36 -2 61 + 1
1963 448 40 +4 66 + 5
1964 472 42 + 2 72 +6
1965 512 46 +4 84 + 12
1966 675 60 + 14 81 -3
1967 958 67 + 7 85 +4
1968 895 80 + 13 81 -4
1969 974 87 + 7 91 +10
1970 1123 100 + 13 100 +9
1971 1160 103 + 3 115 + 15
1972 1552 138 + 35 111 -4
1973 2130 190 + 52 139 + 28
19 74 3010 . 272 + 82 231 +92
1975 3257 290 + 18 278 +47
19 76 4497 400 + 110 431 + 153
1977 5788 515 + 115 768 + 337
1978 7053 628 + 113 937 + 169
1979 7807.6 707 + 79 n.a.
(March)
Notes: n.a. not available.
a Computed by author using data from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics; and 
standardised to those of Helleiner and 
Richardson (1979, Table 26.1). 
b The base has been shifted to 1970 by the author, 
c Narrow money = Cash + demand deposits.
Source: UN, Economic Commission for Africa: Summaries of
Economic Data - Uganda, various issues; IMF, 
International Financial Statistics, various issues; 
IMF, Surveys of African Economies, Vol.2, 1969; 
Helleiner and Belshaw (1979, Table 1.12); Helleiner 
and Richardson (1979, Tables 26.1 and 26.3).
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The equation assumes K constant and Y fairly constant in the short-run. 
Therefore, there will be an approximately proportional relationship between 
nominal money increases and price increases if the equation is to hold.
The Cambridge equation expresses the money demand function, and 
stipulates that in the short-run when real income is fairly constant, demand 
for money is determined by changes in the price level. The constant K is 
determined by yields (expected interest rates) on bonds, capital and 
commodities in a non-inflationary environment; however, this determinant 
loses potency during inflation; a new factor, inflationary expectations, 
comes in to contribute to the demand function.
The causality in the money demand function of the Cambridge 
equation can be reversed so as to determine the causes in price increases. 
Holding real income constant, price increases are made to depend on changes 
in money supply and inflationary expectations during inflation. This price 
function can be put to the test using Ugandan data in order to establish 
whether growth in money supply contributed significantly to inflation 
during the seventies; Table 2.2 provides the data base. The ordinary least 
squares method is used to estimate this economic relationship. The 
logarithmic changes in the consumer price index (log AP) are regressed on 
changes in money supply index (AM) and inflationary expectations (E) for an 
eighteen-year period, 1961 to 1978 (Equation 2.2). The variable E is 
represented by a dummy variable, and equated to zero during a period of no 
inflation (1961-70) but to one during a period of inflation (1971-78). 
Equation 2.3 summarises the results of the estimation: the coefficient of 
changes in money supply is very highly significant at 1 per cent level 
while the coefficient of inflationary expectations is positive but 
insignificant at 10 per cent level.^
1 See Appendix Table 7 for further details.
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Log AP = b + b AM + bo 1 2 E (2 .2 )
* * * * 1Log AP = 2.1066 + 0.0224 
(0.0059)
AM + 0.3718 E 
(0.4845)
(2.3)
R1 2 = 0.70
The results show that changes in money supply contributed very significantly 
to changes in prices during the period 1961-78 and that inflationary 
expectations had no significant influence on prices during the inflationary 
period, 1971-78. Relating the results to Uganda's inflation of the 
seventies, it can be strongly concluded that the rapid growth in money 
supply contributed very significantly to the run-away inflation of the 
seventies while inflationary expectations played only a negligible role.
The Commodity Market
Two noteworthy aspects of Uganda's commodity market are inflation 
and the segmentation of the commodity market. These aspects dominate the 
discussion of the commodity market. First, the inflation; Uganda 
sustained a period of price stability (3.4 per cent per year) in the period 
1960-70, followed by a period of inflation (105 per cent per year) during 
the years 1971 to 1978 (Table 2.2); an attempt is made to trace the causes 
of this inflation.
Theories which have been advanced to explain the movements of 
the commodity price level can be aggregated into at least five groups, 
namely, demand-pull inflation, cost-push inflation, income or markup 
inflation, Neo-Fisherian (monetarist or accelerationist) inflation and
1 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The asterisks indicate
the level of statistical significance (of t-ratios) of the regression 
coefficients; * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 2.5%; **** = 1%.
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sectoral-shift inflation (Makinen, 1977, p.331). The pre-Keynesian 
quantity theorists argue that demand-pull inflation is caused primarily 
by the rise in growth of money supply from its trend rate of growth while 
the Keynesian theorists concentrate on the flow of expenditures as the 
cause of demand-pull inflation; the cost-push inflation theorists associate 
inflation with wage-push or profit-push by trade unions and oligopolists, 
respectively; income or mark up inflation is caused by labour which adds a 
mark up to any perceived productivity gains when seeking higher wages and/or 
by .management which adds a profit mark up to the material and labour costs 
when setting commodity prices; the sectoral-shift inflation theorists argue 
that inflation is caused by a shift in the sectoral composition of demand; 
and finally the monetarists blend demand-pull and cost-push inflation into 
one integrated theory of inflation.
Of the inflation theories so far advanced, the monetarist 
approach appears to provide an appropriate framework for the analysis of 
Uganda's inflation. Both demand-pull and cost-push elements seem to be 
embedded in Uganda's inflation although the presence of the cost-push 
element is not yet'established. Speculations about the presence of cost- 
push inflation in Uganda's inflation seem to arise from the information 
contained in Table 1.1. From the table, it can be noted that Uganda's 
real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 per cent during the period 
1960-70 but declined to a growth rate of -0.3 per cent during the period 
1970-76; for the same periods, the per capita growth rates were 2.4 per 
cent and -3.5 per cent, respectively; the decline in the growth rate of 
per capita real GDP represents a decline in labour productivity. If money 
wages increased or stayed constant in the same period, cost-push inflation
is likely to have prevailed, arising not merely from a rise in money wages
22
but from a decline in productivity.
The interaction of demand-pull and cost-push inflation, arising 
from a rapid growth of money supply and a decline in productivity, 
respectively, can be represented diagrammatically as in Figure 2.1. In 
the diagram, the demand-pull factor is represented by a shift of the 
aggregate demand curve from to D^; the cost-push factor is represented 
by a shift of the aggregate supply (real GDP) curve from to S^ . The 
shift of the demand and supply curves also entails the shift of the 
equilibrium output and price from YQ and PQ to and P^, respectively.
The shift leads to inflation and a decline in real output and employment, 
and is hence called stagflation.
However, a shade of doubt is cast at the presence of cost-push 
inflation in the Ugandan inflation. Although there was a decline in 
productivity represented by a decline in the rate of growth of per capita 
real GDP, there was also a decline in the minimum real wage of 80 per cent 
over the period 1970/71 to 1978 (Table 2.7); it is very conceivable that 
the decline in real wage might have counter-checked the cost-push inflation 
arising from the decline in productivity. That being the case, cost-push 
inflation might have been little or non-existent in the Ugandan inflation; 
this leaves demand-pull inflation to be the dominant factor in the Ugandan 
inflation.
One of the effects of inflation on the Ugandan economy was the 
segmentation of the commodity market. The latter was split into three 
components, namely, the controlled or official market, the blackmarket, and
1 Table 2.7 reveals that the minimum money wage increased by 54 per cent 
over the period 1970/71 to 1978. Since, from the same table, the real 
wage declined by 80 per cent over the same period, the rise in the money 
wage was not a cause of inflation but rather an effort to cope with 
inflation.
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FIGURE 2.1
THE COMMODITY MARKET
Real output (Y)
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the market where "army prices" prevailed. The controlled market: dealt 
with the so-called essential commodities: salt, sugar, soap, cooking oil,
cigarettes, beer, most of the export commodities and some production inputs 
such as labour and fuel (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, p.42). The prices 
offered were ostensibly government-determined and controlled. Additionally, 
prices of imports purchased with foreign currency bought at the official 
rate were determined by the official rate of exchange; however, these prices 
were only for those who had access to foreign exchange officially. The 
prices prevailing in the controlled market were relatively low compared to 
those prevailing in other markets. From Table 2.4, it can be observed 
that, official prices were, in some cases, five times lower than the black- 
market prices. Yet these official prices were entering the computation 
of the consumer price index; they are likely to have led to severe under­
estimation of the inflation rate.
TABLE 2.4
SELECTED KAMPALA OFFICIAL AMD FREE MARKET
PRICES, MAY 1979
Official 
(Shs.)
Free Market 
(Shs.)
Salt 2. GO 20.00
Laundry Soap (bar) 
Maize Meal (1 kilo) 
Sugar (1 kilo)
Bread (li kilo)
15.00
8.00
7.00
7.50
20.00
40.00
40.00
17.50
Source: Helleiner and Belshaw (1979, Table 1.9).
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Then there was the blackmarket. Blackmarketeering was a big 
component of Magendo which is a popular term in Uganda, used to refer to 
illicit but high profit-generating economic activities, mainly internal 
blackmarketeering and smuggling. The prices and profits from such economic 
activities are called Magendo prices and Magendo profits, respectively.
The Magendo or (in fact) free market prices were as high as five times the 
official prices in 1979 (Table 2.4). Based on such prices, the UNLF 
government estimates Uganda's inflation rate to have been 150-200 per cent 
per. year during the period 1971-78 (Africa Research Bulletin, 1979, p.5087c) 
compared to 105 per cent, for the same period, for the estimation which 
includes official prices.
Finally the "army prices" market; it was an ad hoc market whose 
prices were even lower than the official prices (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, 
p.42). The "army prices" were the prices of goods confiscated by army 
personnel or of goods which were sold locally by traders at army gun point.
This split in the commodity market created a big distortion in 
the allocation of resources, diverting resources away from formal production 
to speculative businesses or Magendo. The "army prices" market not only 
intimidated traders but also destroyed their incentive to do business.
The Foreign Exchange Market
Since 1975, the Uganda shilling has been pegged to SDR (or the
U.S. dollar, de facto); Table 2.5 shows the rate at which it exchanged
against the SDR unit:'*- despite an average inflation rate of 105 per cent
per year in the period 1971-78, the Uganda shilling officially depreciated
only by an average rate of 3 per cent per year in the same period. This
1 Appendix Table 2 shows the rate at which the Uganda shilling exchanges 
against the SDR unit and U.S. dollar.
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TABLE 2.5
VALUES AND INDICES OF NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES OF
UGANDA SHILLING PER UNIT OF SDR (1970-100)
Date
Consumer 
Price 
I n de x
SDR
Nomina1 
(U.Shs.) b
cNominal Index Real Index
1970 100 7.7551 100 100
1971 115 7.7551 1 00 87
.1972 111 7.7551 100 90
1973 139 8.3238 107 77
1974 231 8.7466 113 50
1975 278 9.6600 125 4 5
1976 4 31 9.6600 12 5 29
1977 768 9.6600 125 16
1978 9 37 9.0600 125 13
Notes : a Co s t of 1 i v i n g in de x, Ka mpa la low-1 n come ;
from Helleiner and BeIshaw (1979, p.33). 
b Market rate/Par or Central rate, 
c Nominal exchange rate index deflated by the 
cost of living index.
Source: Computed by author using data from: IMF,
International Financial Statistics, various 
a ssues.
represents an average annual appreciation of the: real exchange rate of 11 
per cent for the same period (Table 2.5). On the foreign exchange black- 
market, the Kenya shilling, which is officially at par with the Uganda 
shilling, exchanged for 5 to 10 Uganda shillings in 1978 (Belshaw and 
Stent, 1979b, p.50): this is a de facto devaluation of 500-1000 per cent.
There is no doubt that the Uganda shilling was overvalued.
That, the Uganda shilling was overvalued had some detrimental
effects on certain activities in the economy. It is 1ikeiy to have led
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to a decline in production in the export and import-competing (tradeablos) 
sectors; it: wo take real exchange rate as an indicator of < •ompet i t; i veriest; 
in the international market, then Ugandan industries in general lost their 
conrpetJtivene.es to their international competitors." It also sparked off 
blackrmm'ke tee ring in toreign exchange; inward smuggling of imports and 
outward si.tugv_fj.ing of exports also flourished. The smugoling of imports 
and exports from and to neighbouring countries particularly Kenya was very 
prevalent alter 1976. Of the items smuggled out, coffee, cotton, cattle 
and wheat were the most: important. Inward smuggling included a whole 
range of scarce items. However, no comprehensive estimate has been made 
of the overall goods smuggled in and out of the country. The Commonwealth 
team of experts which vis,ted Uganda in 1079 has made estimates of coffee 
smugc'j. ing, presented in Tab.lt-: 2.6: about 4 5 thousand tonnes of coffee
TABLE 2.6
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION, ALL UGANDA COFFEE,
1975/76 - 1977/78 
(tht:usand tonnes)
1975/76 3976/77 1977/70
R e c o r d e d 0 u t p u t 19 7 157 ] 21
Estimated Smuggled
Quantities 25-20 50-55 4 5-50
Est.imated Production 161-167 206-211 166-171
Source: Bel.shaw and Stent (1979c, Table 4.4)
1 The real exchange rate gives only a general indication of the compet­
itiveness of a country’s industries against other competing countries. 
This indicator does not necessarily reflect accurately changes in the 
relative cost position of any particular industry or sector of an 
economy, which are affected additionally by other factors such as 
relative productivity changes, changes in government assistance 
levels and terms of Made effects.
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(representing about 25-35 per cent: of the national coffee output) appear 
to have been smuggled out of Uganda annually in the period .1975/76 to 
1977/78.
The Labour Market
The concern here is with only one aspect of the labour market: 
the money and real wage rate and its effect on the supply of labour, the 
demand for labour, the mobility of labour between sectors and production 
in the different sectors of the Ugandan economy. The minimum money wage 
in'dex rose by 54 per cent while the minimum real wage index fell by 80 
per cent in the period 1970-78 (Table 2.7); the decline in real wage was a 
result of the inadequately compensated inflation. The real wages were 
flexible downwards because the trade unions, which normally resist any
TABLE 2.7
COST OE LIVING0, NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE INDICES,
1970/71-78
(1970=100)
Cost of Living Kampala Low-Income 
(1970=100)
Minimum Wage Index
Minimum Wage Index, Deflated by 
Low-Income Price Index
1970/71 1975/76 1978
. a b100 a 4 6 785
1.00 14 0 154
100 40 20
Notes: a Average of 1975 and 1976 indices,
b Average fer the year.
c Cost of living appear to be underestimated in comparison to 
Table 1.1.
Source: Extracted from Helloiner and Belshaw (1979, Table 1.12).
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erosion of real wages, were banned by the Amin regime; also the salary 
review commission, composed of civilian bureaucrats, which would other­
wise have increased money wages to cope with inflation, had limited power 
during the Amin regime; hence, inflation was given a right of way to erode 
real wages.
The decline in real wages showed its impact in several areas;
together with the frightful atmosphere created in the country by the
military regime, it was able to exert pressure on skilled personnel to
vacate their positions and flee the country. The outcome was a 28 per
cent vacancy rate in the public sector (which was employing 56 per cent
of the total wage labour in 1977) with the greatest rate in the professional
and technical posts of more than 34 per cent in 1977 (Bentil, 1979,
pp.319-23).^ The decline in real wages also induced employees to take up
more than one job, the extra jobs being in the informal sector (including
Magendo), thus reducing their productivity in the formal sector (Helleiner
2and Belshaw, 1979, pp.32-3). The morale and overall productivity of the
remaining workers in the formal sector were lowered as well because of the
lower real wages; Helleiner and Belshaw (ibid., p.33) describe these
workers as "under-employed or disguisedly unemployed".
Although real wages on the whole declined, they were nevertheless
3higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector; the differential
1 The exodus was more pronounced in 1972 when the military regime of Amin 
expelled the non-Ugandan Asians estimated at 100,000.
2 Employees were induced to take up more than one job because the low 
real wages did not allow a worker to survive on an income from only 
one job. The labour productivity in the formal sector declined 
because workers spent a substantial amount of time working in the 
informal sector at the expense of the formal sector.
3 In fact, in the informal sector of the rural areas, the real wage 
increased from its earlier level (Belshaw and Stent, ibid., p.38) and 
definitely became higher than the minimum real wage in the formal sector.
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in real wage induced a flow back of labour from the formal to the informal 
sector (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, p.38). The low real wages in the 
formal sector had some effect also on the foreign unskilled labour; coupled 
with the extension of smuggling, and commercial enterprises and trade by 
leading figures in the Amin regime to the neighbouring parts of Rwanda and 
Zaire, and, to a less extent, the military government decree banning 
temporary migrants from working in Uganda, it led to the disappearance of 
the short-term migrant unskilled workers from Rwanda and Zaire and the 
return of the permanently resident Banyarwanda workers (Belshaw and Stent, 
ibid., p.38).
In the overall analysis of the labour market, it is evident that
real wages in the formal sector (private and public) were low, and supply
of labour fell short of demand for labour at the then real wage. The
shortage in the supply of labour led to a reduction in production in the
4formal sector (Table 2.9). Some agricultural enterprises whose product
3 (Cont'd)
Belshaw and Stent (ibid., p.38) argue that the increase in real wage in 
the informal sector of the rural areas took place because "in present 
circumstances, the standard task requires only 2-3 hours to complete so 
that labourers 'can work for several employers or work the majority of 
the time on their own plots or engage in Magendo trading and smuggling 
activities". Magendo trading and smuggling activities in the rural 
areas are the subsidiaries of the giant operations in the urban and 
border town areas. The real wage too was less eroded by inflation in 
the rural areas than in the urban areas because of the lower cost of 
living in the former.
The facilitating factor for labour migration from the urban to the rural 
areas in Uganda is the fact that the majority of the urban workers are 
still entitled to or have some land in the rural areas to which they may 
go after retirement. Acute land scarcity is not yet a common feature.
4 The shortage of labour could not be overcome by capital since the latter 
was even more scarce. However, some attempts at substituting labour 
for capital were made; some estates used herbicides when they could 
obtain them. In other cases, more long-term action has been taken:
"one State sugar firm has ordered four mechanical sugar harvesters from 
Australia while other agriculturalists are actively exploring the 
potential suitability of mechanical tea harvesters" (Belshaw and Stent, 
ibid., p.38). The limiting factor to mechanisation has been scarcity 
of foreign exchange with which to import machines.
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prices were not high enough to pay the increased money wages were abandoned 
and replaced by those which could: export crops notably coffee, cotton 
and tea were put aside or replaced by food crops in areas with access to 
urban markets (Belshaw and Stent, ibid., p.42). Hence the traditional 
export crops, which earned foreign exchange and had a high employment 
potential, were abandoned for the locally marketed products (mainly food­
stuffs). The latter fetched higher prices than did the export crops; 
evidence for this is found in Table 2.11 which shows a rise in the real 
food price index but a decline in the real price index of the individual 
export crops.
2.2 The Production Sectors
The discussion on production covers only the major production 
sectors: the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. Because the
former sector is the most predominant, it receives relatively more treatment 
than does the latter sector. Both sectors are found to have performed 
well in the sixties but poorly in the seventies. Within the agricultural 
sector, the export and import-competing sectors deteriorated in production 
while the subsistence food sector only stagnated, during the seventies.
During the same period, the industrial sector, almost uniformly, deteriorated 
in production.
2.2.1 The Agricultural Sector
Table 2.8 shows the production trends of the agricultural sector 
for the period 1967-75. The agricultural sector had its production peak 
in 1969 and it declined thereafter; by 1975, total production was 8 per 
cent below the 1970 level. There is no evidence to suggest that 
agricultural production improved in the years after 1975.
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TABLE 2.3
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION INDICES, 1967-75 
(1961-65=100)
Date Total
Production
Per Capita 
Production
1967 115 103
1968 114 100
1969 129 111
1970 126 105
1971 120 97
1972 124 98
1973 ] 28 98
1974 124 92
1975 118 85
Source: UN, African Statistical Yearbook, .1976: 
Part 3, East Africa.
With respect to the most .important agricultural products - coffee, 
cotton, tea, sugar and tobacco, the decline in production was even greater; 
by the year 1978/79, production had fallen to less than 50 per cent of the 
1970/71 level for all crops except tea (Table 2.9). Cotton, the once 
number one export commodity, recorded production 85 per cent below the 
1970/71 level in 1970/79 while coffee, the number one export item since the 
late fifties and the commodity responsible for more than 90 per cent of 
Uganda's export, earnings in the seventies, recorded production in 1978/79 
only 30-40 per cent of the 1970/71 level (Table 2.9).
The import-competing products of the agricultural sector also 
declined in production. The most important of them, sugar and tobacco,
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TABLE 2.9
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED PRIMARY PRODUCTS 
1970, 1975 AND 1978 
(thousand tonnes)
1970/71 1975/76 1978/79 1978/79^ 
as % of 
1970/71
Tobacco 5.0a 3.6 1.5 30
Tea 18.2 18.3 .1 0.9 60
Sugar 144.0 24.0 12.0 8
Cotton 76. 3 13.8° 11. ld 15
Coffee - Robusta 159.3 123.1 75.0d 4 7
- Arabica 16.2 14.0 c rd5.0 31
Blister Copper 17.0 8.2 2.3 14
Notes; a 1972 figure.
b Column added by author, 
c 1976/77 season (last actual figures).
d Estimated by relevant marketing board for 1978/79 season, 
and excluding output not sold through official channels.
Source: Helleiner and Belshaw (.1979, Table 1.5).
recorded a production decline of 92 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively, 
from the 1970/71 level in 1978/79 (Table 2.9). The livestock industry, 
with one component in the import-competing sector and the other in the 
subsistence sector, did not record a substantial decline (at least until 
1975): it only stagnated, as Tables 2.17, 2.18 and 2.19 reveal.
Subsistence crop production, the other component of the subsistence 
agricultural sector, also stagnated in production (at least until 1975) 
(Table 2.20).
To sum up, production in the export and import-competing sectors
declined enormously while the subsistence sector stagnated. It is important
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to try to identify the possible causes of the decline in the export and 
import-competing sectors, and the stagnation in the subsistence sector 
(non-tradeable sector).
(a) Export and Import-Competing Sectors
Uganda's export performance, judged from the volume of exports, 
declined by 35 per cent in 1976 from the 1970 level (Table 2.10). The 
import-competing sector, represented by sugar and tobacco, also declined 
to below 30 per cent of the 1970/71 production level in 1978/79 (Tables 2.9 
and 2.14). There are several factors which could have contributed to this 
decline.
TABLE 2.10
UGANDA'S EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN VOLUME, 
VALUE,PRICE AND TERMS OF TRADE INDICES, 1967-76
(1970-100)
Date Volume Value Price Terms of Trade
1967 88 35 86 90
1968 84 90 90 98
1969 94 87 87 94
19 70 1.00 100 100 100
1971 S3 105 105 98
19 72 99 102 102 83
1973 91 121 121 85
19 74 76 155 155 76
1975 67 147 147 56
19 76 65 169' 229 80a
Notes: a Calculated by the author using import and
export price indices from UN, Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics, 1977.
Source: UN, African Statistical Yearbook, 1976: Part 3,
East Africa; UN, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics, 1977.
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The low real price level - The real price of Uganda's main cash crops 
declined enormously; the real prices of coffee, cotton and tea in 1978 
were 63 per cent, 49 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively, lower than 
they were in 1970/71 (Table 2.11). The real price of tobacco also declined 
in the same period (Belshaw and Stent, 1979d, p.88-9). The low real prices
TABLE 2.11
REAL RETURNS FROM LEGAL CASH CROP SALES 
AND FROM URBAN-WAGE EARNING
1970/71 1975/76 1978
Cost of Living Index, Kampala Low-Income 
(1970-100) 100 34 6d 785b
Official Grower Price Index, Robusta 
Kiboko
Coffee
100 ] 1 8 294
- Deflated by Low-Income Price Index 100 34 37
Official Grower Price Index, Cotton 100 152 400
- Deflated by Low-Income Price Index 100 44 51
Average Realised Export Price Index, Tea 100
(1972)
117 121
- Deflated by Low-In come Price Index 100 34 1 5
Kampala Low-Income Food Price Index 100 3 81a 12 38
- Deflated by Low-Income Price Index 100 110 158
Minimum Wage Index 100 140 154
- Deflated by Low-1ncome Price Index 100 40 20
Notes: a Average of 1975 and 1976 indices,
b Average for the year.
Source: Helleiner and Belshaw (1979, Table 1.12, p.33).
1 Real price level is used here to mean the nominal (money) price deflated 
by the consumer price index. It is equivalent to the real value of a 
unit of a good or a service.
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led to low real incomes from the crops. The real prices of food crops
(represented by the food price index), however, are observed to have risen
by 58 per cent in the same period (Table 2.11). The rise in prices of
the food items as contrasted to the fall in prices of the main cash crops
introduces a possibility of substitution of the main cash crops for the
food crops; indeed Helleiner and Belshaw (1979, p.33) report that this was
the case especially in areas close to the urban centres.
In the case of coffee, its real price was also low relative to
the. real price offered in Uganda's neighbouring countries - Kenya and
Tanzania; in 1978, for example, the real price of coffee in Uganda was 19
times and 9 times lower than in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively (Table 2.13,
row C). The big gap between coffee producer real prices in the three
countries was caused by differences in taxation systems (rates) and by
different rates of inflation.^ Only 32.3 per cent of the coffee export
value was paid to farmers in 1978 in Uganda compared to 49.9 per cent in
Tanzania and 87.7 per cent in Kenya (Table 2.13, row E); the rest went to
the price assistance fund and/or to the government Treasury as export tax 
2revenue. The inflation erosion on Uganda's coffee real price compared to 
Kenya's and Tanzania's was enormous; the respective money and real prices 
for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in 1978 were Shs./Kg 3.50 and Shs./Kg 1.04, 
Shs./Kg 26.06 and Shs./Kg 20.04, and Shs./Kg 11.00 and Shs./Kg 8.90 (Table 
2.13, rows B and C).
The big differential in the real price of coffee between Uganda 
and her neighbours was further reinforced by the weakened purchasing power
1 The Uganda shilling, Kenya shilling and Tanzania shilling exchange at 
par officially.
2 From Table 2.12, it is evident that the Uganda government took a greater 
percentage of coffee earnings as tax revenue in the period 1972-78.
37
TABLE 2.12
DISTRIBUTION OF COFFEE CROP VALUE 
(%), UGANDA 1972/73-1977/78
Date Farmer Miller CMBa Tax bSurplus
1972/73 39 10 11 30 10
1973/74 27 7 8 4 3 15
1974/75 32 8 10 39 11
1975/76 19 5 7 56 13
1976/77 15 4 6 66 9
1977/78 28 6 6 63 -3
Notes: a CMB: Coffee Marketing Board,
b The majority of the "surplus" shown is paid 
by the Treasury into the Price Assistance 
Fund, which despite its name is used as a 
source of funds for budget expenditures in 
other sectors.
Source: Belshaw and Stent (1979c, Table 4.2) .
of the Uganda shilling (Table 2.5). In the foreign exchange blackmarket 
in 1978, the Uganda shilling fetched a price 5-10 times lower than the 
official par exchange price against the Kenya shilling (Belshaw and Stent, 
1979b, p.50). Belshaw and Stent (1979c, p.61) report that the difference 
in the real price, in terms of what one could buy in Kenya with Uganda 
coffee, was 3,000 per cent in 1978; that is, the real price of coffee was 
3,000 per cent higher in Kenya than in Uganda. This huge differential in 
real price was the principal cause of the smuggling of coffee out of Uganda 
during the period 1975/76 to 1977/78 (Table 2.6).
The delays in payment to farmers for their crop by marketing co-operatives - 
Perhaps another cause of deterioration in the production of the main cash 
crops were the delays in payment to the farmers for their crop deliveries;
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TABLE 2.14
TOBACCO AND SUGAR EXPORT VALUES, 1967-75 
(Shs. Million)
Date Raw Tobacco UnrefinedSugar
1967 - 24.8
1968 2.7 26.5
1969 17.0 15.8
1970 7.5 14.7
1971 13.2 0.4
1972 6.6 0.1
1973 11.9 0.1
1974 8.0 -
1975 16.0 -
Note: 
Source:
negligible
UN, Economic Commission for Africa:
Uganda, various issues; UN, African 
Statistical Yearbook, 1976: Part 3, 
East Africa.
TABLE 2.15
SUGAR, TOBACCO AND RICE PRODUCTION INDICES, 1967-78
(1970=100)
Date Sugar Tobacco Rice
1967 96 (149) 80 (4) 73 (8)
1968 106 (166) 100 (5) 27 (3)
1969 99 (154) 80 (4) 45 (5)
1970 100 (156) 100 (5) 100 (ID
1971 98 (153) 120 (6) 163 (18)
1972 85 (132) 100 (5) 136 (15)
1973 48 (175) 100 (5) 64 (7)
1974 38 (59) 40 (2) 154 (17)
1975 22 (35) 60 (3) 145 (16)
1976 n . a • n . a . n. a .
1977 n . a . n . a n. a
1978a 8 (12) 30 (1.5) n . a .
Notes: n.a. not available
a Data for 1978 computation was extracted from 
Belshaw and Stent (1979d, p.83 and p.88).
() Figures in brackets are thousand tonnes.
Source: Computed by author using data from UN, African
Statistical Yearbook, 1976: Part 3, East Africa,
p.32-13.
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the co-operative unions, which have a monopsony over the marketing of coffee, 
cotton and tobacco, had a shortage of liquidity and hence were unable to 
pay farmers in time for their marketed produce (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, 
p .37; 1979c, pp.76-9; and 1979d, pp.88-9). Delays too were experienced 
in the delivery of dressed seeds for planting due to deterioration in 
transport facilities. The two factors, singly and combined, contributed 
to the loss of production incentives by farmers.
The scarcity of labour - Probably the most limiting factor to production in 
sugar and tea estates was the shortage of labour. The shortage also spilled 
over to the tobacco, cotton and coffee enterprises owned by smallholders.
The main cause of the shortage was the prevalence of Magendo whose black- 
marketeering and smuggling activities were more rewarding than the low real 
wages in formal employment (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, p.38).
The scarcity of basic inputs - Even the basic inputs like hand hoes, 
fertilisers and insecticides were in short supply. For example, imports 
of fertiliser dropped from 27.1 thousand tonnes in 1971 to 3.6 thousand 
tonnes in 1975 while the imports of insecticides dropped from 1.1 thousand 
tonnes in 1971 to 0.3 thousand tonnes in 1975 (Table 2.16);'*' the small 
amount of fertiliser imported was even smuggled back to Kenya just as were 
the hand hoes (Belshaw and Stent, 1979d, p.89). Tractors too became 
scarce and costly. In the coffee industry, the shortage of coffee drying 
trays became very severe. The credit scheme for coffee and tobacco 
producers collapsed as well. Surely the scarcity of these complementary 
inputs must have had a detrimental effect on production.
1 At home, the production of fertilisers and insecticides had already 
ceased by 1977 (for fertiliser production, see Table 2.21).
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TABLE 2.16
IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED FERTILISERS AND INSECTICIDES,
1967-75 
C000 tons)
Insecticides
Date Fertilisers and
Disinfectants
3 967 17., 1 0. 5
1968 20.. 7 1 .9
1969 16,. 3 1.. 6
1970 24..0 1, 4
1971 27.. 1 1..1
1972 18.. 3 0.. 5
1973 10..9' 0.. 6
1974 2.. 2 0., 5
1975 3.6 0.. 3
Source: UN, African Statistical Yearbook, 1976:
Part 3, East Africa.
Transportation problems - The coffee farmers experienced a shortage of 
bicycles and gunny bags to transport coffee from the farm to the society 
store or factory; transport collection schedules for green leaves from 
farmers to factories were unreliable due to poor maintenance of vehicles 
and feeder roads; and there was also a lack of tractors for collecting 
eucalyptus firewood for tobacco processing (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, p.37; 
1979c, pp.69-71; and 1979d, p.89, respectively).
The decline in production incentives of farmers - Small scale farmers are 
the main producers and main source of income for the Ugandan economy 
(Helleiner and Belshaw, 1979, p.26). It is also generally accepted among 
agricultural economists that subsistence farmers respond strongly to
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economic incentives- Therefore a decline in economic incentives is 
bound to lead to reduced production by small farmers; in fact Belshaw and 
Stent (1979c, pp.76-9) believe that the dwindling of incentives of the 
Ugandan farmers due to a severe shortage of basic consumer necessities 
might have contributed substantially to the decline in production.
Financial and foreign exchange problems - Sugar cane (and tea) plantations 
and factories faced financial and foreign exchange shortfalls so that it 
became impossible to replace old ploughs, transport, loading and other 
equipment at the plantations and factories (Belshaw and Stent, 1979d, p.85). 
The plantations further faced a serious deterioration in the management of 
production and processing after the expulsion of the non-Ugandan Asians in 
1972 and subsequent take-over by the government. Production fell so 
heavily (Tables 2.14 and 2.15) that in 1977, the sugar processing plants 
in Lugazi, Kakira and Kinyala were operating at 7 per cent, 28 per cent and 
30 per cent of total capacity, respectively (Belshaw and Stent, 1979d, p.83).
All the forementioned factors worked together to cripple Uganda's 
export and import-competing sectors during the seventies.
(b) The Livestock Industry and the Subsistence Sector
The livestock industry and the subsistence sector appear to have 
stagnated during the seventies; the stagnation in the livestock industry was 
the outcome of a decline in production in the commercial enterprises and a 
rise in production in the subsistence animal enterprises; however, subsistence 
crop production stagnated.
1 The response of subsistence farmers to economic incentives is easily 
exemplified in the response of marketable surplus to price changes.
For evidence of the response, see Medani (1975), Mubyarto and Fletcher 
(1966) and Toquero, et al. (1975). For the response of cotton and 
coffee farmers to economic incentives in Uganda, see Alibaruho (1974) 
and Frederick (1965 and 1969) .
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Commercial animal production - The commercialised enterprises in animal 
production are the dairy and poultry enterprises. Dairy farms increased 
by 116 per cent from 1,400 in 1970 to 3,030 in 1974, with dairy cattle 
increasing by 171 per cent from 56,000 in 1970 to 152,000 in 197 3; 
however, 1974 saw a big decline of 75 per cent in dairy cattle, from the 
1973 level (Table 2.17). The big increase in dairy farms and dairy cattle 
(at least until 1973) was not accompanied by an increase in milk pro­
duction; the latter actually stagnated; this implies a decline in farm 
productivity. Productivity in ranches also declined; despite a big 
increase in the number of ranches, from 148 in 1970 to 329 in 1974 and 
moreover with the same or even higher level of fertility of ranch land, 
the number of cattle on ranches increased only marginally (Belshaw and 
Stent, 197vd, p.91).
TABLE 2.17
DAIRY FARMS, CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION, 1970-74
Date
Da.i ry Farms Dairy Cattle Milk Production
Number Index
(1970-100)
Number 
(’000)
Index
(1970=100)
Quantity Index
('000 tons)(1970=100)
19 70 14 00 100 56 100 2 75 100
1971 24 39 174 99 177 286 104
1972 2721 1.94 113 202 295 107
197 3 3050 218 152 271 267 97
19 74 30 30 216 77 138 276 100
Source: Ministry of Veterinary Services and Animal Industry, Kampala;
UN, African Statistical Yearbook, 1976: Part 3, East Africa;
Indices were computed by author therefrom.
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Commercial poultry declined in production: it reached its peak
in 1972 with 8,981 production units containing 3 million birds and fell 
thereafter to 1,785 production units containing only 400,000 birds in 1974 
(Belshaw and Stent, 1979d, p.92); this was a decline, in production, of 
more than 80 per cent in 1974 from the 1970 level. The deterioration in 
production is bound to have continued thereafter since chicken concentrates 
were becoming even more scarce.
Subsistence animal production - Although the commercialised sector of the 
animal industry declined in production, in general the subsistence 
component of the animal industry appears to have improved; there was a small- 
increase in livestock numbers and in the volume of livestock products. 
Evidence to support this proposition can be found in Table 2.18 of livestock 
population and Table 2.19 of livestock production. In the former, the
TABLE 2.18
LIVESTOCK POPULATION INDICES, 1967-75 
(1970=100)
Date Asses Cattlea Pigs Goats Sheep
1967 100 (17) 89 (3682) 50 (37) 99 (1900) 92 (784)
1968 94 (16) 96 (3971.) 58 (43) 90 (1710) 91 (775)
1969 100 (17) 93 (3848) 72 (53) 9 7 (1845) 90 (768)
1970 100 (17) 100 (4145) 100 (74) 100 (1911) 100 (855)
19 71 100 (17) 103 (4280) 85 (63) 94 (1801) 97 (827)
1972 100 (17) 107 (4419) 112 (83) 107 (2038) 104 (887)
1973 94 (16) 97 (4000) 95 (70) 102 (1950) 88 (750)
1974 94 (16) 99 (4100) 97 (72) 105 (2000) 82 (700)
1975 94 (16) 101 (4200) 100 (74) 107 (2050) 82 (700)
Notes: a lncludes da i iy and ranch cattle.
() Brackets contain real numbers ot animals in thousand units.
Source: Computed by author using data from UN, African Statistical
Yearbook, 1976: Part 3, East Africa, p.32-4.
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apparent stagnation in total livestock population despite a decline in the 
number of commercial animals implies that a rise in non-commercial live­
stock population took place. With respect to the volume of livestock 
products, poultry increased in output by 43 per cent in 1975 from the 1970 
level and goats milk by 9 per cent while beef, goat, cows milk and pork 
faced a constant level of production, and mutton declined by 33 per cent 
(Table 2.19). The fact that total beef, poultry and cows milk never faced 
a decline in production, at least by 1975, despite their decline in the 
commercial sector, implies that a compensatory increase in the subsistence 
animal sector production had taken place. The latter sector uses small 
amounts of purchased inputs unlike the commercial sector which uses them in 
plenty, and these inputs were very scarce during the Amin era. This 
probably explains the marked difference in the production performance of 
the two sectors.
Subsistence crop production - With the exception of maize and sorghum,
subsistence crop production, on average, stagnated during the seventies
(Table 2.20). Another obvious feature in subsistence crop production are
the fluctuations in production (Table 2.20), probably arising from the
heavy dependence on natural rainfall whose quantity and distribution tend
to vary annually. The stagnation in subsistence crop production can be
associated with deterioration in productivity since there had been an
increase in area under food crops (Belshaw and Stent, 1979e, p.95).
Belshaw and Stent (ibid., p.95) further report that the production of food
crops received labour and land resources from traditional export crops as
a result of a rise in the prices of food crops relative to export crops;“*"
1 The rise in farm-gate prices of food crops was not uniform throughout 
Uganda because of an increased deterioration in all forms of road 
transport, and secondly, because of the increased harassment of traders 
by Amin's troops (Belshaw and Stent, 1979e, p.95).
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another cause of the shift of labour into food production (and mainly 
subsistence production) was the loss of incentives by farmers to produce 
for the market since purchased agricultural inputs were unobtainable and 
the consumer goods to be bought with market surplus were very scarce. 
Ultimately, there was a retreat into subsistence production with an 
objective to maintain production at a level necessary to meet food 
requirements of individual households.
2.2.2 The Industrial Sector
Uganda's industrial sector, though small, is nevertheless 
important; the manufacturing component produces mainly import-substitutes 
while the mining sector produces for export. However, the sector 
deteriorated substantially during the seventies; most of the industrial 
plants were working under capacity while others had stopped working 
altogether.
By 1970, the manufacturing sector was producing enough to meet a
large part of domestic demand and exporting an appreciable proportion of
output mainly to other members of the then East African community.'*' But
then during the seventies, production dropped drastically (Table 2.21): by
1977/78, of the important manufactures, only one industry (cigarettes) was
maintaining the 1970 level of production leaving the rest of the industries
working below the 1970 level; of these working below the 1970 level, all,
except beer, waragi and paper, were operating at below 75 per cent of the
1970 level, and more than half were operating below 45 per cent of the 1970
level; indeed some industries virtually collapsed. The principal factors
behind the decline in production were the continuous shortage of foreign
1 The community collapsed in 1977. Her members then were Uganda, 
Tanzania and Kenya.
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TABLE 2.21
OUTPUT OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES: 1970, 1975, 1977-78
Unit 1970 1975 19771977-73 '% of
-78 as 
1970 .
Cotton and Other 
Fabrics
M. Id near 
Metres 54.6 39.1 30.3 55
Blankets ' 000 1164 322 165 14
Socks and Stockings ' 000 Dozen 1246 261 290a 23
Soap '000 Tons 12.9 3.6 1.2 9
Paper '000 Tons 160 3b 1805 1380 86
Cooking Oil '000 Tons 13.0 6.1 1. 5 11
Paints ' 000 Litres 1660 852 586a 35
Matches '000 Car tons 49.3 31.4 8.1 16
Cement '000 Tons 191 98 7 3 38
Superphosphates '000 Tons 24.8 4.0 0 0
Corrugated Iron 
Sheets '000 Tons 11.9 1.4 0.8 7
M.S. Rounds, 
Squares etc. ’000 Tons 17.6 6.3 7.9a 45
Beer M. Litres 27.8 38.8 22. la 79
Waragi '000 Tons 563 859 420 75
Cigarettes Million .1536 1754 1867a 122
Notes: a These figures refer
b 1972 figure.
to 1977, all others are for 1978.
Source: Helleiner and Belshaw (1979, Table ] . 3, p. 2 8) .
exchange for importing essential inputs, the lack of trained man-power,^
and organisational incompetence (Hamisi, et al., 1979, p.105).
Mineral production declined as well (Table 2.22). Copper, which 
used to be number three foreign exchange earner after coffee and cotton in 
the sixties, entered a phase of deterioration in the seventies; the 1977
1 The technical and managerial class had been dominated by non-Ugandan 
Asians whom the Amin government expelled from Uganda in 1972.
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output was only 13 per cent of what was produced in 1970. In fact all 
minerals deteriorated in production with an exception of gold. What 
appears to have been the main cause of production was the scarcity of 
foreign exchange with which to import new machinery and spare parts; in 
addition, the minerals mined on a small scale lacked an organised market 
to buy and sell them (Hamisi, 1979, p.165).
2.3 The Balance of Payments, 1961-79
Uganda's balance of payments also followed the general trend of 
the economy - an upturn in the sixties and a deep downturn in the seventies. 
The trend can be traced in Table 2.23 which provides a summary of Uganda's 
balance of payments account for the period 1961-77. We shall first discuss 
the 1960s' balance of payments and then the 1970s'.
Balance of payments, 1961-70.
From Table 2.23, several observations can be made about the 
balance of payments for the period 1961-70: there were trade balance
surpluses all through, recording a peak of SDR 88.3 Million in 1970; 
however, the current account showed deficits for the years 1965-69 
inclusively, implying that the deficits in service transactions and 
transfer payments had been greater than the surpluses in the merchandise 
trade balance. The deficits in the current account were more than 
compensated by capital net inflows so that there were additions to the 
international reserves for that period.
The capital account recorded persistent capital net outflows, in 
the period 1961-64, reaching a peak of U.S.$33.6 Million in 1964. The 
IMF (1969, pp.362-4) reports that these capital inflows were mainly private 
capital and that the government brought them to a halt in 1965 by extending
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TADLE 2.23
A SUMMARY OF THE COMPONENTS OF UGANDA'S
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1961-77a 
(Million SDRs)
Trade
Balance
Current 
Accoun t:
Capital
Account
Changes in 
International 
Reserves
1961 2 3.0 17.5 -6.2 -6.7
1962 21.0 0.9 -0. 3 5.6
1963 39.4 19.7 -25.4 11.2
1964 57.1 32.5 - 3 3.6 5.9
1965 17.4 -4.1 30.5 - 3.6
1966 18. 7 -26.5 36.1 -20.9
1967 24.9 -20.6 20. 1 -10.0
1968 23.4 -11.9 13. 7 -10.6
1969 20.8 -14.2 16.0 -9.8
1 9 70 83.3 20. 3 4.1 -3.8
19 71 -3.8 -85.5 37.7 40. 1
19 72 84.7 15.1 25.4 -8. 3
19 7 3 83.6 36.1 -13.3 7.2
19 74 43.0 -20.0 7.4 15.1
19 75 7.3 -46.2 -6.1 -0.4
19 76 101.2 37.4 -14.7 -2.0
19 77 155.2 58.3 -23.4 -0. 5
Note: a From 1961 to 1969 inclusive, values are
expressed in Million US dollars.
Source: IMF’, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various issues;
IMF, Surveys of African Economies, Vol.2, 1969, 
p.363.
the exchange controls to sterling area countries other than Kenya and 
Tanzania. The stricter exchange control coupled with the net inflow of 
official capital afforded by the government's reduction of its investment 
abroad (IMF, 1969, p.364) managed to reverse capital flows from a 1964
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U.S.$33.6 Million net outflow to a U.S.$30.5 Million net inflow in 1965.
For the rest of the decade, the. capital account recorded capital net 
inflows.
International reserves were drawn down in the period 1962-64 
partly because of substantial capital net outflows but, more important, 
because the government made extensive use of them to finance budget deficits 
(IMF, 1969, p.364). From 1965 to the end of the decade, the international 
reserves were replenished annually.
Balance of payments, 1971-79.
Again with respect to Table 2.23, it can be observed that the 
foreign exchange reserves picture during the period 1971-77 was gloomy: 
over the period reserves fell by SDR 51.2 million. The stagnation 
of export earnings and the extraordinarily high capital net outflows 
characterise the gloomy picture of the balance of payments of the 
seventies.
Appendix Table 4 presents an aggregated summary of Uganda's 
balance of payments in the period 1970-77. With the exception of 1977, 
when there was a huge increase in the price of coffee, export earnings on 
average remained constant over the period 1971-77; in fact they would have 
declined were it not for a rise in the export price index.^ Export 
production deteriorated to such an extent that by 1977, coffee remained 
virtually the only export commodity.
The capital account deteriorated too; after 1972, the short-term 
capital account registered capital net outflows annually while the long-term
1 During the period 1970-76, the export price index rose by 129 per cent 
while the export volume index fell by 35 per cent (Appendix Table 3).
The rise in prices more than compensated the decline in the volume of 
exports to keep the value of exports rising.
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capital account also registered capital net outflows in the years 1976 and 
1977 as the government started the repayment of the heavy debts it had 
accumulated. This capital flight was sparked off by the expulsion from 
Uganda of the non-Ugandan Asians and the ex-appropriation of their 
businesses; the erosion of the real interest rate by inflation and the 
loss of confidence, by foreigners, in the deteriorating economy contributed 
substantially to the persistent capital net outflows of the seventies.
The deterioration in export production, the unfavourable capital 
outflows and the failure of Uganda to live within its means hastened so 
that by April 1979, there were only SDR 16 Million - only enough to buy ten 
days worth of imports at the 1971 volumes; this ran side by side an external 
debt of SDR 93 Million, about one third of Uganda's merchandise export 
earnings of 1976 (Helleiner and Belshaw, 1979, p.34).
2.4 A Summary and Plan of Action
In this chapter, an assessment of Uganda's principal markets,
production sectors and balance of payments was made. It was found that
the economy faced serious problems during the seventies; the bank credit-
financed budget deficits gave rise to run-away inflation which eroded the
real wage, real interest rate and the real exchange rate.'*' The low real
wage in the formal sector led to a shortage of labour and lowered the
morale and productivity of the workers; and the reduced real exchange rate
(overvalued currency) gave rise to smuggling, and reduced the profitability
of export and import-competing production. Overall production deteriorated,
external debts accumulated and the foreign reserves ran dry. These
problems were aggravated by the Liberation War which brought further
1 There was inadequate compensation for inflation in the money, labour 
and foreign exchange markets.
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destruction to the economy. Obviously, the immediate challenge is 
economic stabilisation and rehabilitation.
With economic stabilisation and rehabilitation in mind, a 
framework centred on the achievement of internal and external balance 
objectives will be developed in the next chapter. This framework will 
be used to analyse the macro-economic stabilisation problems in the 
rehabilitation of the Ugandan economy and to highlight the critical
policy requirements.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE: THEORY
AND RELEVANCE
Despite the vagueness of the concepts of internal balance and
external balance,1 2they are nevertheless important in the theory of
economic policy. They were introduced into the discipline of economics
by Meade as far back as 1951 (see Meade, 1951). Since then many
approaches, pioneered by Meade (1951) and Tinbergen (1952), have been
developed to tackle the problem of simultaneously achieving internal
2(full employment and price stability) and external balance. However, 
perhaps the clearest and most useful approach has been the geometric 
approach pioneered by Swan (1955) . It was further advanced by Salter 
(1959) who geometrically combined non-traded goods and traded goods on two 
axes to define a price ratio (between non-traded and traded goods) and a 
level of expenditure appropriate to the attainment of internal and
1 Shone (1979) points out the vagueness that surrounds the definitions 
of the concepts of internal balance and external balance. The 
original definition of internal balance by Meade (1951, p.106) intended 
internal balance to mean full employment and price stability. As
the Keynesian IS-LM analysis, that assumes stable prices, gained 
ground, internal balance was used to mean full employment; this means 
that the attainment of full employment would automatically ensure price 
stability. However, the view has now changed; it is clear that price 
stability does not necessarily follow full employment (at least in the 
long run); they are in fact two separate objectives as Meade (1978) 
now contends.
Shone (1979) explains also that external balance is sometimes confused, 
in literature, with external equilibrium, and the time horizons (long- 
run and short-run) are sometimes not specified. He concludes that it 
is better to do away with external balance as an objective in its own 
right and instead "concentrate purely on policy targets - whether this 
be a short-term deficit, a certain level for the reserves, or a combined 
strategy on the percentage depreciation (appreciation) in the exchange 
rate and the degree of its variability" (1979, p.224).
2 For an evaluation of some of the literature on the subject see 
Whitman (1970).
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external balance objectives. Then Corden (1960-61) reviewed the studies, 
on the attainment of internal and external balance objectives, that use 
the geometric approach, and in addition, systematically derived Swan's 
four zones of "economic unhappiness" along with four policy sectors. 
Waterman (1966) too derived Swan's diagram starting with Swan's 
assumptions. While all these authors worked in the context of a 
developed economy, Garnaut (1977) in an unpublished paper derived a 
diagram similar to Swan's but developed from within the context of a 
developing economy.
This chapter presents geometric models of internal and external 
balance from three perspectives:
(i) the nature of the economy: developing or
developed;
(ii) accommodation of dynamic factors; and
(iii) the application of the theory to the macro-economic 
stabilisation problems of Uganda's economy.
3.1 Internal and External Balance in Developed Economies: the Swan-
Corden Model
What I call the Swan-Corden Model is actually Swan's diagram and 
its later derivation by Corden, along with the derived policies to 
achieve internal and external balance objectives. The model represents 
a geometric approach to analysing internal and external balance problems 
in developed economies.
Swan (1955) produced the diagram of internal and external 
balance, presented in Figure 3.1. He took productivity, the terms of 
trade, capital movements and other financial transfers as given, and 
assumed no special import restrictions on balance of payments grounds.
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FIGURE 3.1
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE
Cos't
Ratio
(R)
IB ZONE 1 EB
ZONE IVZONE II
ZONE III
Real Expenditure (E)
Notes: IB - Internal balance.
EB - External balance
Zone I : Over-full employment and balance of payments surplus.
Zone II : Under-full employment and balance of payments surplus. 
Zone III : Under-full employment and balance of payments deficit. 
Zone IV : Over-full employment and balance of payments deficit.
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In his diagram, cost ratio (R) is a ratio of international prices (export 
and import prices) to local wage indexes with weights to reflect supply 
and demand sensitivities for different commodities to changes in 
relative costs. The cost ratio measures the competitive position of 
the country's industries (Australia). Real Expenditure (E) includes 
both public and private expenditure at constant prices. The two heavy 
lines give different combinations of cost ratio and real expenditure that 
yield internal and external balance. They thus "...divide existence into 
four zones of economic unhappiness" (Swan, 1955, p.386) as defined in 
Figure 3.1. The broken lines show four quadrants for policy guidance. 
They emphasize an important point that "... in each zone the necessary 
direction of adjustment of one of the two factors, expenditure and cost 
ratio, is apparent, whereas the other may be either too high or too low,
depending on our precise position in the zone...... This is the source
of many of the problems and errors of economic policy - if one factor 
is substantially out of line, the natural indication for the other may be 
quite misleading. For policy, we need to know which quadrant we are in, 
whereas the mere facts of the employment situation and the balance of 
payments can tell us only which zone we are in." (Swan, 1955, p.387). 
Corden (1960-61) later emphasized the same point.
Corden (1960-61) derived Swan's diagram but using home-produced 
goods on the vertical axis and imports on the horizontal axis. He 
assumed a constant value of exports, a constant foreign price of imports, 
and no multiplier effects; and he used an indifference curve to define 
policy sectors. Under these assumptions, he used a combination of price 
(switching) and expenditure adjustment to achieve both external and 
internal balance. The expenditure switching policies (from imports to
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home-produced goods) that he used, are import restrictions, devaluation, 
decline in prices of home-produced goods and tariffs.
3.2 Internal and External Balance in Developing Economies: The
Garnaut-Swan Model
What is here called the Garnaut-Swan model was basically 
developed by Garnaut. It is the representation of the model, the internal 
and external balance diagram, which bears strong similarities with the 
Swan diagram of internal and external balance (Figure 3.1).
Garnaut (1977) developed a model of internal and external 
balance for small, open, developing countries. Basic to the model are 
four sectors: the village sector, modern export sector, modern import-
competing sector and government sector. For convenience, he calls the 
last three sectors the modern sector in contrast to the village sector.
The model can also accommodate a modern services sector without altering 
the basic argument. The model further assumes:
(i) immediate adjustment to changes in the 
economic environment;
(ii) a fixed exchange rate;
(iii) that households and firms have perfect 
knowledge of future developments; and
(iv) that transport costs and costs of over­
coming resistances to trade are held 
constant.
The model also takes as given:
(i) the terms of trade;
(ii) productivity in all the four sectors;
(iii) overseas and domestic interest rates;
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(iv) rates of taxation; and 
(v) net overseas borrowing.
3.2.1 Description of Sectors
(a) The Village Sector
The village sector produces goods and services for subsistence 
and agricultural goods for export. The cash it receives from exports 
and subsistence surplus is used to purchase importables or else it is 
hoarded. Labour moves from the village to any one of the three sectors 
if the standard of living, represented by the expected modern sector 
wage income, exceeds that represented by village life with its expected 
subsistence production and export income by a sufficient margin to cover 
migration costs.
(b) The Modern Export Sector
The modern export sector is able to sell any quantity of its 
products on international markets at a given world price. It uses 
domestic labour in production together with importable machinery and 
goods, and foreign labour, all in fixed proportions. Real costs of 
production are determined by the real domestic wage level, the real 
interest rate, and the real cost of importable goods and services. Pre­
tax profits are determined by the real wage level, real interest rates and 
the relationship between international prices of importables and exports. 
Investment is expanded when expected pre-tax profitability exceeds some 
minimum level that is specified in international currency.
(c) The Modern Import-Competing Sector
The modern import-competing sector is identical in structure
to the export sector except that it supplies only the domestic market, the
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size of which depends on the total level of domestic expenditure. Its 
products are sold at international prices except when a tariff has been 
imposed. Investment is expanded when existing productive capacity is 
too small to supply domestic demand, or else when it has penetrated 
external markets. All current inputs (domestic and foreign labour, 
importable materials) are required in proportion to production.
(d) The Government Sector
The government sector provides services for the economy as a 
whole and for each of the four sectors. It implements programs the 
level of which is varied as a matter of government policy. The programs 
require domestic and foreign labour and importable materials in fixed 
proportions. The real cost of a program varies with the real wage level 
and the real cost of importable goods and services.
Employees of the modern sector receive income as wages and 
spend a part or all of this on importable commodities. There is a 
Financial Authority (henceforth, together with the government, referred to 
as the Authorities) which undertakes to lend or borrow from firms in all 
sectors and househölds at a specified interest rate which may be varied 
from time to time. The Authorities also receive grants from foreign 
governments and impose taxes in the form of export levies on exports, 
import and excise taxes on imports and importables respectively, taxes on 
incomes and wages, and profit taxes on firms in the export and import- 
competing sectors. The Authorities create whatever money is necessary 
to finance the desired level of government programs. The same Authorities 
can lend any quantity of cash on international markets at a given interest 
rate as well as borrowing from it some small amounts at the same interest 
rate, but must pay interest at an increasing rate as the level of
borrowing increases.
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All firms in the export and import-competing sectors, and all 
households can lend to or borrow from the Authorities. Additionally, 
the foreign firms can borrow from and lend to international markets on 
terms determined in the markets, just as well as foreign households 
(in the country) can. Village households do not lend or borrow although 
they hold balances of cash.
The domestic price level is determined as the international 
price of importables multiplied by the rate at which the domestic currency 
exchanges for international currency, plus taxes on importables. The 
prices of exports move together on world markets, as do those of 
importables although they may do so at different rates. The difference 
in price movements of exports and importables will be called the terms of 
trade.
3.2.2 Internal and External Balance 
(a) Internal Balance
Standard of life varies within the village sector and between 
village and modern sectors. At a given real modern sector wage, the 
standard of life offered by urban life is more attractive than village 
life for some village people and may induce them to sell their labour 
to the modern sector. Thus we can map a wage labour supply function 
which relates various real wage levels to the number of workers who would 
prefer wage employment to continued life in the village.
The modern sector demand for labour is determined by the scope 
of government programs and the level of real wages, given the assumptions 
made. Garnaut (1977, p.iv) defines "... internal balance as a state in 
the labour market in which all persons who prefer wage employment at
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the going wage rate to village life can find employment with the least
amount of search that is consistent with equilibrium in the structure
of real wages." He (1977, p.iv) calls it "the Friedman - Phelps
natural rate of unemployment" the phrase, natural rate of unemployment,
being borrowed from Friedman (1968, pp.8-9) and Phelps (1971, pp.1-26).^
A real wage rate below or above this level causes excessive
demand for or supply of labour, respectively, until balance is restored
again in the labour market. The migration of labour in this scheme
follows the labour market models of Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro
(1970). Migration stops when the expected real wage multiplied by the
probability of getting an urban job is equal to the village real wage.
In Figure 3.2, real wages are expressed in terms of money wages
2deflated by international prices, to which demand (D ) for and supply
-Li
(S ) of labour respond. However, public sector demand for labour is Li
determined by the volume of government programs (G), independently of
the real wages. Private sector demand for labour, however, has an
inverse relationship with real wages, that is, it is a normal negatively
sloped demand function. In Figure 3.2, a slight negative relationship
between real wages and demand for labour by public sector is drawn
although the shape of internal balance schedule would not be changed if
demand for labour was insensitive to real wage. The labour demand
function, D , shifts to the right from D G to D G as government L L L L 2
programs are expanded from G^ to G^- The expansion of government programs
1 Therefore, Garnaut defines full-employment as equal to the natural 
rate of employment.
2 Real wage is the inverse of Swan's (1955) cost ratio, and Garnaut's 
diagrams, therefore, are the inverse of Swan's diagrams. The 
difference is just in the presentation; otherwise the argument, 
represented in the diagrams, is the same.
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FIGURE 3 . 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL BALANCE
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raises the level of real wages that is consistent with internal balance 
from to W^. A schedule for different levels of government programs 
and real wages consistent with internal balance is plotted in Figure 3.3. 
(b) External Balance
Since the Authorities have to exchange domestic for foreign 
currencies at the going exchange rate, there is a state in which the 
demand for foreign currencies is met by supply of foreign currencies in 
order to meet the commitment to convert currencies. This state, called 
external balance, may be defined "... as the state in which supply equals 
demand for foreign currencies at the going exchange rate." (Garnaut,
1977, p.v).
Supply of foreign exchange is a result of exports of goods and
services and capital inflow. In Figure 3.4, the foreign exchange supply
curve, S , is determined independently of the levels of real wages and F
government programs. It is possible that the level of foreign exchange
earnings from exports might be inversely related either to the level of
real wages or of government programs.^ This would not alter the shape
of external balance schedule in Figure 3.5 or the conclusion of the
analysis. The demand for foreign exchange, D , manifested in the importsF
of goods and services and capital outflow, is determined by the total
level of domestic expenditure, and is affected in a positive relationship
by real wage level and the level of government programs (G). D GF X
relates the level of real wages to demand for foreign exchange with
government programs, G . D G represents the same relationship at the1 r 2
expanded level of government programs, G . The locus of combinations
1 At this point Garnaut's model tends to underplay the importance of real 
wages in determining the competitiveness of the export sector.
However, Swan's model takes real wages as a main determinant of export 
sector competitiveness (Section 3.1). The difference in emphasis on 
real wages does not alter the common argument with regard to external 
balance.
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FIGURE 3.4
THE DETERMINANTS OF EXTERNAL BALANCE
FIGURE 3.5 
EXTERNAL BALANCE
Payments Deficit
Payments
Surplus
EB (External Balance)
Levels of Government Programs
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of real wages and government programs that are consistent with external 
balance are plotted in Figure 3.5. Now combining Figure 3.5 and 
Figure 3.3 of external and internal balance, respectively, gives Figure 
3.6 of simultaneous internal and external balance. At the real wage 
rate, W^, and level of government programs, GQ, internal and external 
balance are attained simultaneously. Anywhere away from that point to 
any of the four zones, there is what Swan (1955, p.386) calls "economic 
unhappiness".
Garnaut's model is basically similar to Swan's model and the 
Swan-based model of Corden (1960-61). The differences are:
(i) Garnaut's model is developed from the economic institutions 
of a (small, open) developing economy whereas those of his predecessors 
assume a developed economy context (or do not specify the state of the 
economy). The pioneer, Swan (1955), developed his for the Australian 
economy;
(ii) Garnaut's model puts on the horizontal axis levels of 
government programs simulating public expenditure whereas Swan assumes 
real expenditure composed of public as well as private expenditure; 
and
(iii) Garnaut's predecessors use the terms over-full employment 
synonymously with inflation, and under-full employment with deflation; 
they therefore suggest that internal balance is attained if, and only if, 
there is full employment (internal equilibrium). The literature is in 
agreement with the Phillips curve hypothesis (Phillips, 1958). Garnaut, 
however, defines internal balance (full employment) purely in terms of
labour employment at the prevailing real wage. He (1977, p.iv) takes the
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FIGURE 3.6
SIMULTANEOUS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE
Excess Supply of Labour
Payments Deficit
Excess Demand for Labour
Excess Supply of Labour Payments Deficit
Payments Surplus
Excess Demand for Labour 
Paymenits Surplus
Levels of Government Programs
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Neo-Fisherian view of the labour market and bluntly states that there is 
"... a natural rate of unemployment" at full employment, that unemployment 
being voluntary and caused by frictions in the labour market. Therefore 
his full employment is achieved at the natural rate of employment. Thus, 
he implicitly denies the existence of a long-run trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation (Phillips curve); he can only accept the 
occurrence of shifts over time of the Phillips curve (Makinen, 1977, 
pp.346-62). Secondly, he does not claim that his internal balance is 
equivalent to Keynesian internal equilibrium, that is, a full employment 
level of income with stable prices. His internal balance is defined 
purely by the demand-supply conditions in the labour market; it is not 
necessarily identical to the full-employment level of income. In the 
same light, his internal balance does not necessarily mean price stability 
unless it is assumed that:
(.1) real wages are changing at the same rate 
as the rate of change of labour 
productivity; and
(2) at the starting position to the drive 
towards the natural rate of employment 
(internal balance), there is no general 
expectation of future inflation or 
deflation of money prices.
Meade (]P78) redefines his original internal balance (1951, p.106) 
in the same manner as Garnaut. It. is no longer used to mean simultaneous 
attainment of full employment and price stability unless the assumptions 
made above hold. If the assumptions are removed, then full employment
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and price stability become two separate objectives of macro-economic 
policy.
We shall apply Garnaut's model of internal and external balance 
to Uganda's economy in the light of the clarifications made above.
Price stability and full employment will be taken as two separate 
objectives of macro-economic policy.“^
3.2.3 The Model in the Ugandan Context
Garnaut's model of internal and external balance designed for 
small, open, developing economies is very much relevant to Uganda's 
economy. However, a few qualifications have to be made:
(a) How Open is Uganda's Economy?
Uganda's economy exhibits a high degree of openness: during
1961-66, the average ratio to GDP at market prices was 31 per cent for 
exports and 22 per cent for imports (IMF, 1969, p.351). Whereas the 
overall degree of openness stayed on average the same through the 1970s, 
there was a considerable reduction in imports; for example, in 1976, 
the ratio to real GDP at factor cost rose to 41 per cent for exports but 
fell to 9 per cent for imports (Table 1.1) because of the restrictions 
imposed on the issue of foreign exchange for trade;
(b) The Village Sector
The village sector remains surprisingly dominant in Uganda
especially in the agricultural export and import-competing sectors.
Composed of small-scale farmers, the village sector produces all the
cotton and tobacco, 95 per cent of all coffee, and 50 per cent of all
1 Shone (1979) argues that internal balance has outlived its usefulness 
as an economic objective, and hence should be replaced by price 
stability and full employment as two separate objectives. His line 
of argument is similar to the clarifications made above in Garnaut's 
model.
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sugar and tea, among other things (Helleiner and Belshaw, 1979 ,
Table 1.2).
Contrary to the assumption in Garnaut1s model, the village sector 
makes some savings through thrift and loan societies, and also through 
banking institutions (though to a small extent); the households do lend 
and borrow among themselves and occasionally receive credit channelled 
through the co-operatives. However, the savings and credit operations 
are not substantial;’*’
(cl The Modern Sector
Uganda's modern export sector is composed of large-scale farmers, 
plantations, processing industries, mining and light manufacturing 
industries with home-based markets but with surplus for export (Sections 
2.2.1(a) and 2.2.2). The modern import-competing sector is comprised 
of large farms and some processing and light manufacturing industries with 
home-based markets (Sections 2.2.1(a) and 2.2.2(a)). The combined 
import-competing and export sectors are still small relative to the village 
sector. But of importance too is the government sector which is bigger 
than either of the other modern sectors; and 
(d) Imported Labour
Apart from importing skilled labour, unskilled labour is also 
imported from Rwanda and Zaire (Section 2.1.4).
The qualifications listed above do not affect the applicability 
of the model to the extent of altering the main argument.
1 Although Garnaut's model and Uganda's economy differ in the size and 
some economic operations of the village sector, the difference is 
not so substantial as to require change in the basic argument of the 
model in its application to Uganda.
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3.3 Dynamic Factors and the Adjustment Mechanism of the Internal- 
External Balance
The internal and external balance theory so far discussed and 
presented in Figure 3.6 (for Garnaut's model) is static in analytic 
approach. Changes over time can be introduced into the analysis. However, 
this requires variation of one or more of the factors which were taken 
as given or assumed constant. For example, both Garnaut's and Swan's 
models take productivity, among other factors, as given (Sections 3.2 
and 3.1, respectively). In the long-run, productivity is bound to change 
with changes in capital stock, technological knowledge (innovations) and 
the capital-labour ratio. To maintain internal and external balance 
when t’nere is a change in productivity, the determinants of internal and 
external balance have to adjust to the change. Let us trace the 
adjustment path for changes in productivity in Garnaut's internal-external
balance model.''’ We shall first follow the effects of a decline in 
productivity.
A decline in labour productivity, due to a decline in capital 
stock and/or technological knowledge and/or capital-labour ratio, 
necessarily reduces marginal productivity of labour which defines the 
demand curve for labour. Such a change induces a shift to the left of 
the demand curve for labour in Figure 3.2 of the determinants of internal 
balance. Given the labour supply schedule in Figure 3.2, equilibrium 
iri the labour market is only possible at a lower real wage. We cannot 
be certain a priori which direction of adjustment the level of government 
programs will take; we are only certain that lower real wages are 
consistent with internal balance when there is a decline in productivity.
1 Garnaut, i.n his model, traces changes in the terms of trade, exchange 
rate and investment.
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This implies a shift to the right of the internal balance curve in
Figures 3.3 and 3.6."^  In the foreign exchange market, a decline in
productivity is bound to decrease supply of foreign exchange (export
earnings) since the export sector as well would undergo a decline in
production. This induces a shift to the left of the foreign exchange
supply curve in Figure 3.4. A decline in productivity leads also to
lower incomes and hence a lower demand for foreign exchange. Therefore
a decline in productivity induces a shift to the left of the demand
curve for foreign exchange in Figure 3.4. The shift to the left of the
demand and supply curves for foreign exchange is consistent with a lower 
2real wage. Therefore a decline in productivity lowers the real wage 
that is consistent with external balance. The explanation of this 
proposition is that if a government were to increase its level of programs 
(spending) in the face of a reduced foreign exchange supply resulting 
from a decline in productivity, the increased aggregate demand would 
spill over to the imports (and probably exports) and induce a balance of 
payments deficit; the increase in real wage accruing from an increase in 
government spending would increase per unit cost, and would, hence, 
reduce the competitiveness of the home industries. Either way, an 
increase in the level of government programs, when there is a decline in 
productivity, leads to external imbalance. In the face of a decline 
in productivity, a lower real wage and a lower level of government programs 
are consistent with external balance; the external balance curve shifts
1 It is assumed here that the level of government programs will rise or 
stay constant. If it falls, then the shift of the internal balance 
curve to the right will take place only if the percentage decline in 
productivity is greater than the fall in the level of government programs.
2 This conclusion follows only if supply of foreign exchange is inversely 
related to real wages as Garnaut (1977, p.vi) suggests, and if the 
shift in the supply curve is greater than the shift in the demand curve.
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downwards (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). The positions of the internal and 
external balance curves before and after the decline in productivity 
are presented in Figure 3.7: simultaneous internal and external balance
before and after the decline in productivity are marked as A^ and A^, 
respectively. A^ is at a lower real wage (W^ ) and level of government 
programs (G^ ) than is A^. The policy message put forward is that when 
an economy loses its productivity, it must be prepared to accept a lower 
real wage for its labour and a lower level of government programs 
(spending) if it is committed to maintaining both internal and external 
balance. Any other combination of real wage and government spending 
would drive the economy into one of the four zones of economic unhappiness 
as defined in Figure 3.8.
3.4 Uganda's Internal-External Balance, 1964-76: Evidence of a Shift
Figure 3.9 shows internal-external balance lines and macro-
2economic performance of Uganda's economy for the period 1964-76. The 
figure is drawn using figures from Appendix Table 5. The two right hand 
quadrants, I and IV, show the deviations of real growth in GDP above the 
average growth for Uganda over the period 1960-76 for the period 1964-76, 
while the left hand quadrants, II and III, show the deviations below 
the average rate of growth. Thus, quadrants I and IV represent in a 
rough way growth rates that could be excessive (over employment) for 
internal balance if maintained for a long time, and may lead to inflation. 
Quadrants II and III are zones of under-employment and may lead to a
1 When there is an improvement in productivity, there is a reverse shift
of the curves: the internal balance curve shifts to the left while
the external balance curve shifts upwards.
2 Drysdale and Kojima (1978a, pp.14-16) did a similar analysis, less 
shifts in the internal balance curve, for Australian, Japan and 
United States economies for the period 1972-77.
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FIGURE 3.7
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE: ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTIVITY DECLINE
Levels of Government Programs
Notes: IB
EB
A
2
Internal balance 
External balance
Simultaneous internal-external balance before productivity 
decline
Simultaneous internal-external balance after productivity 
decline
Numerals 1 and 2 refer to situations before and after productivity 
decline, respectively.
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FIGURE 3.8
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE: ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTIVITY DECLINE
(SHOWING ZONES)
Levels of Government Programs
Zones: They refer to the positions after the adjustment to a decline in
productivity.
I : Payments deficit, Excess supply of labour (deflation)
II : Payments surplus, Excess supply of labour (deflation)
III : Payments surplus, Excess demand for labour (inflation)
IV : Payments deficit, Excess demand for labour (inflation)
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depression if they persist. The two upper quadrants, I and II, represent 
balance of payments surpluses, while the lower two, III and IV, represent 
balance of payments deficits. Large balance of payments surpluses or 
deficits over a long period represent external imbalance; action has to 
be taken to reduce them. From Figure 3.9, a number of observations can 
be noted. First on the external balance curve: on the whole, external
performance for all years was within close quarters of the external balance 
except for the abnormal year, 1971, which incurred a tremendously large 
balance of payments deficit which claimed international reserves 
equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. The 1960s were characterised by balance 
of payments surpluses'1' while the 1970s were characterised by deficits. 
Secondly on the internal balance curve: 1969 comes out as a year of
extremely good performance with real growth rate 8 per cent above the 
average. The 1960s were characterised by growth rates above the average 
while the 1970s were below the average. The latter were so much below 
the average that one can conceive of a new internal balance curve for 
them (drawn in a broken line). This represents a shift of the internal 
balance curve to the left. This shift is in accord with the analysis 
represented in Figure 3.7 that was arrived at from the theoretical approach. 
Although no shift of the external balance curve is obvious in Figure 3.9, 
still the more prevalent deficits in the balance of payments of the 1970s 
are symptoms of a possible shift. Given these results about Uganda's 
economy (derived from Figure 3.9), it is now apparent that the Amin regime 
left Uganda's economy incapacitated and operating with internal balance 
corresponding to a far lower rate of growth than it was in the 1960s. ■ With 
inflation running at an average rate of 105 per cent per year for the eight
1 The 'years 1962 and 1963 (which are out of our analysis here) all had 
balance of payments deficits. However, they were still within close 
quarters of the external balance.
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years of the period 1971-78, Uganda's economy finds itself in Zone IV of 
inflation and balance of payments deficit (Figure 3.8).1
Although Garnaut's model provides a very useful framework for the 
analysis of production, employment, price level and balance of payments, 
it only does so at a very high level of aggregation. This macro-economic 
analysis ought to be supplemented by sectoral analysis in order to enable 
a better understanding of the working of the economy; the latter is a 
necessary background to policy analysis and evolving strategies for 
economic rehabilitation and development.
With respect to sectoral analysis, the main interest lies in 
production, employment and wages; more specifically, it is important to 
examine how changes in labour productivity interact with changes in real wages 
to induce changes in production, employment and unemployment in the different 
sectors of the economy. The next section will be addressed to the examination 
of these issues; a three sector model is devised to form a framework for 
the necessary analysis; and the specification of the sectors is consistent 
with Garnaut's in his internal-external balance model.
3.5 Productivity, Real Wage and Employment
In Chapter 2, attention was given to the response of the forces 
of supply of and demand for labour to changes in real wage, and the 
mobility of labour between sectors of the economy in response to changes 
in real wages. Here an additional factor, labour productivity, is 
introduced and the interaction of real wages and labour productivity, 
and their impact on employment and total output in the different sectors 
of the economy and the economy as a whole, assessed.
1 Indonesia's economy in the period 1958-66 was very much similar to Amin's 
economy of Uganda. Glassburner (1971) reports that per capita national 
product in 1966 was 3.6 per cent below the 1958 level (ibid.,p.11), 
foreign exchange reserves had dropped from the 1960 level of US$313 
Million to US$17 Million in 1967, and inflation reached a peak of 600 per 
cent in 1966. Indonesia, like Uganda, also qualifies for Zone IV of 
economic unhappiness of internal-external balance.
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A Three Sector Model
A model economy consists of three sectors: the village sector,
the modern sector and the urban traditional sector.
Description of the Sectors
The village and modern sectors are still as defined in Garnaut's 
model in Section 3.2. The village sector produces agricultural goods 
for export, and subsistence goods and services for its own consumption 
but sometimes with a surplus for sale in domestic markets. Marginal 
product is positive (there is no surplus labour) and equates the real 
wage. The assumption of positive marginal productivity is realistic at 
least in the African context (Todaro, 1969). The modern sector is 
composed of the export sector, import-competing sector and the government 
sector. The government sector produces non-traded goods (mainly services). 
The modern sector, like the village sector, is a profit maximiser and 
labour is paid the value of its marginal product.^
The urban traditional sector as described by Todaro (1969, p.139) 
encompasses "... all those workers not regularly employed in the urban 
modern sector, i.e., the overtly unemployed or sporadically employed, and 
those who grind a meagre existence in petty retail trades and services."
It is an accommodating sector for the migrants from the village to the 
modern sector and from the modern sector back to the village sector.
From the general equilibrium sense, the geographical location does not 
matter; it can be located anywhere but functionally it neither belongs to 
the modern sector nor the village sector.
For our purpose in this model, total labour force will be 
distributed between the village and modern sectors, leaving the residual
1 A question arises as to whether the government sector's labour is paid 
the value of its marginal product. On the whole, real wages in the 
government sector hardly equate marginal product. However, one can 
put forward a case that there is a positive relationship between real 
wages and marginal product. For simplicity in this model, we shall 
assume that real wages in the government sector equate marginal 
productivity (also admitting profit maximisation).
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labour in the urban traditional sector as generally unemployed. This 
is the same approach as that of Todaro (1969). The exportables and 
importables are priced internationally (except for tariffs, export 
subsidies, and others) and their prices are given (small country 
assumption) whereas the subsistence crops (mainly staples) and the rest 
of the non-tradeables are domestically marketed and priced. A perfect 
market is assumed in the commodity market.
Each sector has a fixed capital stock (including human capital) 
in.the short-run but variable in the long-run. The main variable factor 
of production is labour. However, it is complemented by other variable 
productive inputs. There is a fixed labour/complementary productive 
inputs ratio. The employment of variable resources increases with 
increasing capital stock (though not necessarily a pure direct 
proportionality). Technological knowledge is fixed in the short-run.
1 The labelling of the labour in the urban traditional sector as
unemployed is done here only for the sake of simplicity of the model. 
It is now beyond doubt that the urban traditional sector (informal 
sector) is "... important not only as a source of employment but 
also for the economic functioning of the cities and the economising 
of scarce resources, in re-use of products as well as in reduced 
needs for equipment and buildings. Though productivity is low 
compared to the modern sector, it is far superior to unemployment 
and in all probability exceeds productivity in marginal employment in 
agriculture." (World Bank, 1972, pp.10-12; cited by Meier, 1976, 
p.210). However, it should be noted that employment in the urban 
traditional sector becomes important only if there is inadequate 
growth of employment in the formal sector. Therefore, the urban 
traditional sector serves the very important and noble role of 
providing employment and a living to those who would otherwise be 
overtly unemployed. But the role of the urban traditional sector 
in Uganda during the period 1971-79 was quite different: it was
inducing and employing labour from the more productive formal sector 
whose real wages had been eroded by the uncompensated inflation 
(Section 2.1). Therefore, rather than getting residual labour from
the formal sector, Uganda's urban traditional sector was starving the 
formal sector of the labour it badly needed. Given that the formal 
sector is more productive than the urban traditional sector, the 
economic development strategy would definitely be to discourage the 
latter in the Ugandan case. This study will take a similar view.
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All factors are specific to sectors except labour which is mobile between 
sectors.
3.5.1 Static Analysis
Using a general equilibrium approach similar to Corden's (1974, 
pp.129-57), the village sector, the modern sector and the residual urban 
traditional sector of the unemployed can be represented as in Figure 3.10. 
The minimum real wage equates the marginal product but is higher for the 
modern sector (W^) than for the village sector (V^), leaving a wage 
differential (W^-V^). OM^ labour is employed in the village sector,
0*N^ in the modern sector and are unemployed in the urban traditional
sector. Uganda's labour market was of this type in and prior to 1970 
before the Amin regime. In this situation of the labour market, labour 
is not optimally allocated, and total production is not maximised either. 
Labour is optimally allocated when the marginal products in the village 
and modern sectors are equal; at this level of labour allocation, denoted 
by Z in Figure 3.10, the wage differential is equal to zero; there is full 
employment of labour and total production is maximised.'*'
3.5.2 Dynamic Analysis
(a) General Theory
In the long-run, the stock of capital may appreciate or increase
through reinvestment, as Lewis (1954, p.152) argues, as well as depreciate
or decrease through disinvestment. Such changes in capital, stock and/or
technological knowledge work to shift the production function curve along
with the derived curves. So the marginal product curve shifts as well.
1 At this level of optimal allocation of labour, the real wages in both 
sectors are equal and represented by E^in Figure 3.9.
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The shift of the marginal product curve induces a shift of the real wage 
curve and hence a change in the allocation of labour. The real wage 
itself normally changes through a change in money wage and/or in price 
level. The change in money wage is quite often a result of a move taken 
by government agencies and/or trade unions. Employers tend to have 
less control of money wages unless they form a cartel. The real wage 
is often assumed to be flexible upwards and not downwards, the downward 
inflexibility being imposed by trade unions which always create pressure 
to.stop any erosion of real wages which may be caused by inflation or by 
a reduction in money wages. Such an inflexibility of the real wage 
retards the adjustment process to equilibrium in the labour market.
However, there are cases where real wage is flexible downwards.
(b) The Ugandan Case, 1971-79
In Chapter 1, it was shown that Uganda's capital stock 
decreased during the period 1971-79 through depreciation and disinvestment. 
Technological knowledge also seriously declined as the Asian technicians, 
managers and entrepreneurs got expelled from Uganda in 1972,^ as well as 
a result of the exodus of the indigenous Ugandan professionals who were 
running away from Amin's deteriorating political as well as economic 
environment. Coupled with the serious scarcity of complementary 
productive factors especially the imported ones, the decline in capital 
stock and technological knowledge caused a fall in production as is 
demonstrated in Section 2.2 of the production sectors. The per capita 
GDP real growth rate fell from an annual average of 2.4 per cent in 1960-70
1 Up until 1972, most of the technical and managerial jobs in the 
private sector as well as some in the public sector were occupied 
by Asians. Almost all commerce was under their control.
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to -3.5 per cent in 1970-76 (Table 1.1). This is sufficient evidence 
to show that marginal product must also have fallen during the period 
1971-79. In Figure 3.11, the shifts of the marginal product curves 
are represented by P to in the modern sector and P ^  to P ^  in the
village sector. Evidence of a bigger decline in production and marginal 
product in the modern sector than in the village sector as is depicted 
in Figure 3.11 is provided in Section 2.2. The minimum real wage in 
the modern sector declined (Section 2.1.4) and the decline is represented 
in.Figure 3.11 by a change from to . But the real wage in the 
village sector increased from its former level and became even higher 
than the real wage in the modern sector (Section 2.1.4); the increase is 
represented in Figure 3.11 by a change from to ^
Although no estimate of the urban traditional sector labour is 
available, the swelling of the urban population despite a decline in 
modern sector employment is already an indication of growing numbers in 
the urban traditional sector. This sector, during the Amin regime, 
grew big and notorious. It became the centre for black market, smuggling
and Magendo in general. It included labour which was employed
permanently or part-time in the modern and village sectors but spent a 
part of their labour (man-hours) in this sector; then there were full­
time employees and employers of the sector; and finally there were those 
who were unemployed most of the time but managed to survive by hook or by 
crook in the sector. The last of the three groups of people of the 
urban traditional sector are commonly known as the Bayaye in Uganda. The 
then military government occasionally rounded up the Bayaye and took them
1 The changes in the minimum real wage were mainly due to inflation 
which was not equally compensated for by changes in money wages to 
maintain the same level of real wages. Since the modern sector had 
a higher rate of inflation than had the village sector, real wages 
were eroded faster in the former than in the latter. In fact the 
real wage in the village sector rose because it was bid up by the more 
profitable sources of employment, mainly Magendo trading and smuggling.
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to sugar cane and tea plantations for wage employment but they would 
escape from there and report back in preference to unemployment in the 
urban traditional sector. Real production (output) from the urban 
traditional sector was definitely low especially when looked at from the 
social (national) point of view, but incomes to individuals were high - 
so high as to attract to the sector even the very high ranking military 
officers of Amin (Belshaw and Stent, 1979a, p.42). Although its main 
location was in the urban areas, the urban traditional sector had 
subsidiaries in rural areas as well as in neighbouring countries 
especially in the case of smuggling. The increase in the unemployed in 
the urban traditional sector, during the period 1971-79, is represented 
in Figure 3.10 by the increase from M^N to M^N^. w i^at as also apparent 
from Figure 3.10 is a fall in national production represented by the 
shaded area; this is in unison with the empirical evidence given in 
Table 1.1 and Section 2.2. It is also apparent from the diagram as well 
as from Section 2.2 that the decline in production was greater in the 
modern sector than in the village sector.
The results from the above sectoral analysis of employment, 
real wage and productivity seem to agree with the results obtained from 
the theoretical and empirical analysis of internal-external balance in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, that there was a shift of the internal 
(and external) balance curve in Uganda's economy during the period 1971-79. 
The capacity of Uganda's economy to produce, approximated by the internal 
balance, was substantially destroyed during that period.^ Worse still, 
the economy did not adjust to the momentary equilibrium, marked A^ in
1 The destruction is represented by the shifts of the internal and 
external balance curves in Figures 3.7 and 3.9.
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8; excess aggregate demand pushed the economy into 
Zone IV of inflation and external deficits (Figure 3.8). This section, 
along with Section 2.2, further reveal that the modern sector declined 
in production more heavily than did the village sector; and that 
frictional (voluntary) unemployment was very substantial despite a 
severe shortage of (excess demand for) labour in the village and modern 
sectors. Based on this analysis, the chapters to follow will attempt 
to devise policies to solve Uganda's immense problems of underproduction, 
unemployment, balance of payments deficits and inflation.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the previous chapter, a framework of internal and external 
balance was drawn and used to analyse the macro-economic stabilisation 
problems of the Ugandan economy; changes in the production capacity of the 
economy were represented by shifts of the internal and external balance 
curves. This chapter exploits the dynamic and adjustment aspects of the 
framework to devise stabilisation, rehabilitation and development policies 
and strategies for the economy: with respect to stabilisation policy,
three policy objectives are set out, namely, price-level stability (anti­
inflation) , external balance and full employment; with regard to 
rehabilitation, the production capacity to be restored is represented by 
a certain level of economic growth; and as regards development, certain 
levels of economic growth and employment desirable to sustain a reasonable 
level of development are set. At the end, the chapter sets out policy 
targets and a policy calendar for the next seven years. This chapter only 
derives policy objectives and targets; the search for policy instruments is 
done in subsequent chapters.
4.1 Internal and External Balance Diagram: The Position of the Ugandan
Economy
Figure 3.8 (redrawn) presents an internal and external balance 
diagram featuring the four zones of economic unhappiness after a shift of 
the internal and external balance curves induced by a decline in 
productivity. In the diagram, the Ugandan economy fits in Zone IV of 
inflation and balance of payments deficit, at a lower level of production
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FIGURE 3.8 (redrawn)
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE: ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTIVITY DECLINE
(SHOWING ZONES)
Levels of Government Programs
Zones: They refer to the positions after the adjustment to a decline in
productivity.
I : Payments deficit, Excess
II : Payments surplus, Excess
III : Payments surplus, Excess
IV : Payments deficit, Excess
supply of labour (deflation) 
supply of labour (deflation) 
demand for labour (inflation) 
demand for labour (inflation)
capacity: inflation is running at 105 per cent per year for the period
1971-78, international reserves equivalent to 0.9 per cent of real GDP are 
drawn down annually, on average, for the period 1971-76, and the economy is
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growing at an average annual rate of -0.3 per cent (for the period 1971-76). 
Inflation in Uganda is characterised by a segmentation of the commodity 
market into official, black and "army prices" markets. A balance of 
payments deficit co-exists with an overvalued currency and the smuggling 
of tradeables. There is also low employment, output, labour productivity 
and real wages (Figure 3.11); they co-exist with a scarcity of labour, and 
substantial unemployment most of which is voluntary. This represents the 
general position of the Ugandan economy.
4.2 The Move to Simultaneous Internal and External Balance
Given that the Ugandan economy is in Zone IV of inflation and 
balance of payments deficit at a low level of production capacity, it would 
be desirable if the economy moved towards point A^ of simultaneous internal 
and external balance (Figure 3.8). Such a movement implies the pursuit of 
three policy objectives, namely, price-level stability (anti-inflation), 
external balance and full employment. The three policy objectives 
constitute the stabilisation policy package.
4.3 Restoration of the Production Capacity
At point A^ of simultaneous internal and external balance, the 
economy is in a state of price stability, full employment and external 
balance; the corresponding real wages and the level of government programs 
are lowered (Figure 3.8). Hence, internal and external balance objectives 
can be attained only if the government is prepared to live with low real 
wages and a low level of government real spending.
After the attainment of economic stability, the next move is the 
restoration of the 1970 production capacity. The move requires a reverse 
shift of the internal and external balance curves to their former positions:
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from IB^ to IB^ and EB^ to EB^ of the internal and external balance curves, 
respectively (Figure 3.8). The policy objective is to increase per capita 
real GDP or labour productivity at the national level. It will be assumed 
that employment rises pari-passu with output (growth); hence, only minimal 
emphasis will be laid on employment creation per se as a policy objective.^ 
The minimal emphasis on employment creation should take the form of, for 
example, the deployment of labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive 
techniques of production.
The restoration of the production capacity, while maintaining 
price stability, external balance and full employment, places the Ugandan 
economy at point A^ of simultaneous internal and external balance (Figure 
3.8): it implies a higher national productivity consistent with internal
and external balance. Such a restoration of the production capacity marks 
the end of the rehabilitation phase.
1 That employment rises with output is not necessarily true; there is 
some evidence to the effect that employment lags behind or grows 
negatively with economic growth. For example, Meier (1976, pp.170-6) 
reviews the evidence to show that industrial employment lags behind 
growth in Latin America, Asia and Africa: in the case of Uganda, non-
agricultural output was found to increase at an annual rate of 7.7 per 
cent during the period 1954-64 while total non-agricultural employment 
was growing at an annual rate of -0.1 per cent for the same period.
In proposing that only minimal emphasis be put on employment creation 
as a policy and instead relying on the employment opportunities created 
by economic growth, I am of course aware of the weakness of the under­
lying assumption that employment grows with economic growth. However,
I have taken that leverage in order to avoid the employment-growth trade­
off which has been found to exist: that there is a trade-off between
employment maximisation and growth (see for example Peacock and Shaw, 
1971, pp.24-6). Since the main objective of the rehabilitation is the 
restoration of production capacity (growth), then employment creation 
as a policy in its own right ought to be postponed; it is hoped that 
the rehabilitation program will create some employment particularly in 
the construction and building industry, and the agricultural sector.
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4.4 Developing the Production Potential
The restored production capacity of 1970 is by no means sufficient 
to ensure an adequate and sustainable rate of economic growth for the 
eighties. It is important that the production potential of the economy 
be boosted; such a boost is represented, in the internal and external 
balance diagram (Figure 3.8), by a substantial shift of the internal 
balance curve from IB^ to the left and the external balance curve from EB^ 
to the right.
However, this is not to suggest that a satisfactory and sustainable 
rate of economic growth necessarily leads to development; it is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition. The attainment of development 
also requires a reasonable distribution of the benefits of growth between 
persons and regions among other things. An equitable distribution of 
income, on the other hand, is facilitated by a high level of employment. 
Therefore, a development strategy ought to incorporate at least economic 
growth, employment and equity objectives. These must be the major policy 
objectives in development strategy.^
4.5 Towards a Consistent Economic Policy
The policies discussed so far fall under three categories:
stabilisation, rehabilitation and development. The three categories appear
to be separate entities and attainable at different points in time; for
example, stabilisation policy is pursued in the short-run while rehabilitation
and development are pursued in the medium-run and long-run, respectively.
However, the policy timing aspect can be modified, without policy conflicts,
such that stabilisation and rehabilitation policies run concurrently in the
1 The instruments to attain the objectives which are incorporated in the 
development strategy will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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short-run while leaving development policy a long-run issue.
It is important to note that macro-economic stabilisation is very 
crucial to the success of rehabilitation and development and must take 
precedence over them; inflation must be subdued and imbalances in the 
different markets’^ of the economy corrected before rehabilitation and 
development objectives can be seriously pursued.
4.6 Policy Targets and a Policy Calendar
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the major economic objectives
and the performance of the Ugandan economy. For the period 1950-76,
actual performance is presented while for the period June 1979 - June 1986,
it is the planned performance which is presented. Estimates of the actual
performance have been drawn from Table 1.1 and Appendix Table 5 (except for
2employment estimates). The estimates of planned performance are based on 
the economy's production capacities and stabilisation potential (internal 
and external balance) which were discussed in the last chapter.
The stabilisation and rehabilitation programs are to be imple­
mented in the period June 1979 - June 1981 which is a period of two years.
1 The markets in question are the money, foreign exchange, labour and 
commodity markets.
2 Employment data is very sketchy and incomplete. It is only the 
employees of the public sector and registered public companies who are 
recorded as employed (see, for example, the various issues of UN (1963- 
74)). This leaves out the bulk of the workers who are employed on 
rural farms as well as the self-employed. Domestic servants as well 
are excluded (Knight, 1968). The use of such employment data does not 
serve our purpose here.
Data on unemployment is not available either. Only tentative statements 
about unemployment can be spotted here and there. That there was high 
employment and insignificant unemployment during the fifties and sixties 
was pointed out by IMF (1969, p.319) and Knight (1968), and this piece 
of information will be relied on for the assessment of employment.
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That two years are considered adequate is based on Indonesia's experience 
where it was managed to complete stabilisation and rehabilitation programs 
within two years (Arndt, 1971), starting from a situation not dissimilar 
to Uganda's.^- The first development plan is to take five years, based on 
Uganda's traditional planning system since independence.
On policy targets, an economic growth rate of real GDP of at 
least 3 per cent during rehabilitation and at least 6 per cent during the 
development phase have been planned. The rehabilitation target of 3 per
cen-t is the average growth rate of Uganda's economy for the period 1960-76: 
it includes the prosperous 1960-70 and the poor 1970-76 periods (see 
Appendix Table 5). The development phase target of 6 per cent is based 
on 5.3 per cent - the average annual growth rate of the economy for the 
period 1960-70. A target of 6 per cent is feasible since, by the beginning 
of the development phase, the production capacity of the period 1960-70 will 
have been restored; there are also economies of scale that are likely to be 
enjoyed from the new production capacity and the previously under utilised 
capacity especially in the perennial crops of agriculture.
With respect to external balance, the zero per cent and 0.5 per 
cent changes in international reserves as a percentage of real GDP planned 
for the rehabilitation phase and development phase, respectively, are 
feasible, given the stabilisation policy proposed in the next chapter.
With respect to inflation targets, a not more than 20 per cent
inflation rate by the end of the two years is totally feasible. For
example, Indonesia after 1966 managed to reduce its inflation from an
inflation rate of 600 per cent per year to 10 per cent within about two
1 Indonesia's inflation, balance of payments deficit and economic growth 
during the period 1958-66 were similar to Uganda's; they were discussed 
in Chapter 2.
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years (Arndt, 1971). Although the 1960s were less inflationary than the 
1970s internationally, and hence an easier period to control inflation in 
the sixties than in the seventies, nonetheless Uganda should be able to 
reduce its inflation rate of the period 1971-78 from 105 per cent per year 
to less than 20 per cent per year within two years; it is certainly possible 
to achieve inflation rates no greater than international rates of inflation 
and probably feasible to reduce the inflation rate below the international
rates.
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CHAPTER 5
STABILISATION POLICY
The aim, in this chapter, is to set out a stabilisation strategy 
to alleviate the macro-economic stabilisation problems of the Ugandan 
economy. Three major policies are proposed: anti-inflation policy,
external balance policy and full employment policy. The strategy gives 
priority to correcting distortions in the markets of the economy in order 
that market forces may play a greater role in the working of the economy; 
this works towards the elimination of Magendo - mainly blackmarketeering 
and smuggling, as well as the reduction of the excessive government inter­
ference (with associated corruption) in economic activities. The three 
major policies of the stabilisation strategy are designed such that they 
are consistent. An important aim would be to have the stabilisation 
program completed within two years.
5.1 The Approach
An approach to economic policy entails at least the following 
conditions: specification of consistent policy objectives and targets, an
assessment of alternative effective policy measures or instruments, 
determination of the criteria of choice between instruments and the 
assigning of instruments to targets, and ensuring that the selected 
instruments are consistent with the simultaneous pursuit of the policy 
objectives in question. In line with the approach, the major economic 
objectives and their targets for the Ugandan economy were specified in the 
previous chapter and presented in Table 4.1. With respect to stabilisation
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policy, a price level of no more than 20 per cent was specified, as well 
as a zero change in international reserves as a percentage of real GDP, 
and a full employment target, all to be attained within two years. The 
next task then is to assess the policy measures and instruments necessary 
to attain these policy targets, and to determine the criteria for use in 
selecting the most effective instruments to attain the targets, while 
ensuring that the instruments are consistent with the objectives being 
pursued simultaneously.
The attainment of price-level stability involves a combination 
of several policy measures; so long as these measures are consistent among 
themselves and with other policy measures aimed at achieving other 
simultaneously pursued objectives, it is of no concern to specify each 
measure's contribution to the attainment of the anti-inflation objective. 
The same case applies to the measures aimed at the achievement of full 
employment. The contributions of such measures are assessed in totality. 
In the case of the external balance objective, however, the policy instru­
ments can be deployed singly, and are also liable to easy classification 
and quantification; the instruments in question are those which effect 
switching. These switching instruments can be classified in their order 
of effectiveness and efficiency based on sound criteria. Such a 
classification has been designed by Corden (1974, pp.28-31); it is this 
classification that is used in this study. The classification gives the 
highest merit to that instrument which attains the policy target with the 
least cost but highest level of effectiveness. The cost of achieving a 
policy target comprises not only the inevitable cost that accrues from the 
deployment of the policy instrument but also the side costs which are 
attributed to it. Corden (ibid., pp.9-33) calls the latter group of
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costs by-product distortions of a corrective policy. Based on the
magnitude of the by-product distortion costs of each policy instrument,
he orders the policy instruments in a hierarchy of instruments from first-
2best to second-best and so on (ibid, pp.28-31). He concludes that "at 
each step down the hierarchy, an additional by-product distortion is 
imposed, and the welfare level attainable with the optimal policy declines" 
(ibid., p.28). Corden's criteria of choice between policy instruments 
will be used in selecting the first-best switching instrument for the 
attainment of the external balance objective.
5.2 Price-Level Stability (Anti-Inflation)
In Chapter 2, it was argued that the theory which appears to 
provide an appropriate framework for the analysis of Uganda's inflation is 
the monetarist theory of inflation; it combines demand-pull and cost-push 
inflation into one integrated theory of inflation. In the first instance, 
there is a rise in commodity prices triggered by excessive aggregate demand 
(demand-pull); then follows a rise in the money wage prompted by labour- 
attempts to restore the real wage which prevailed prior to an expansion in 
aggregate demand: prices are pushed up even further (cost-push). In
1 A by-product distortion is a term used in the classification of domestic 
divergences. In Corden's classification of domestic divergences (ibid., 
p.13-4), he calls a marginal divergence any divergence between marginal 
private and marginal social costs or benefits. Then he takes a 
distortion as a particular kind of divergence - that divergence caused 
by, and only by, a government policy. Then he calls a by-product 
distortion any by-product of a government policy designed to correct
or partially correct a divergence, the latter defined in the broadest 
sense; therefore a by-product distortion is caused by, and only by, a 
corrective government policy. Corden (ibid., p.14) explains that his 
system of classification of domestic divergences is essentially the 
same as Bhagwati's (1971).
2 Inevitable costs are not considered in the construction of the hierarchy 
of policy instruments because the former are common to all policy 
instruments.
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Uganda's inflation, however, the cost-push factor has arisen primarily not 
from a rise in money wages but from a decline in labour productivity. It
is even highly questionable whether cost-push inflation prevailed in 
Uganda since inflation effects of the decline in labour productivity might 
have been neutralised by the big decline in the real wages of the formal 
sector. Since there is no clear-cut evidence to confirm the presence of 
cost-push inflation in the Ugandan economy, Ugandan inflation then ought 
to be attributed to the demand-pull factors. The most effective measure 
against this type of inflation is restrictive fiscal and monetary policy.
5.2.1 Fiscal Policy
Uganda's budget deficits, whose accumulation has been growing at 
an average annual rate of 67 per cent in the period 1972/73 - 1978/79, have 
been the prime cause of the rapid growth in money supply; ultimately they 
have provided fuel for inflation. They, therefore, must be put to an end 
in order that inflation be curbed.
The Ugandan budget has shown a deficit since independence 
(Appendix Table 1).^ This long-standing tradition could be broken by 
balancing the budget or at least reducing substantially the fiscal deficit 
but this requires a revolution in budgetary operations. Government 
expenditures must be drastically reduced to the level of government revenue. 
The success of such a move depends on the ability of the government to 
raise far more revenue while spending far less than it has been doing. If
government revenue does not increase from last year's (1978/79) level, the
1 The only exception is 1976/77 when a budget surplus was realised; the 
coffee price boom of that year gave a tremendous boost to government 
revenue whose main source is the coffee export tax (see Table 5.1).
2 in Uganda's budgeting, government revenue is a sum of domestic revenue 
and long-term capital inflow on the government account while government 
expenditure is a sum of capital and recurrent government expenditure.
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government will have to cut spending by Shs.1313 Million (Appendix Table 1), 
about 20 per cent of the 1976 real GDP, in order to balance the budget. 
Alternatively, if it maintains the same level of spending, the government 
will have to raise additional revenue of this magnitude from within and 
without the country.
Government revenue - The lack of growth in the Ugandan economy has meant a 
reduced tax capacity while the smuggling of coffee, a commodity which has 
been the prime source of government revenue, through export tax, in the 
seventies (Table 5.1), has further reduced Uganda's government revenue.
To complicate the situation further, the high export tax on coffee has been 
complementary to the overvalued currency in inducing coffee smuggling. 
Ostensibly, the Ugandan government has limited maneuverability in raising 
more tax revenue. However, there are still some potential avenues to 
explore; the most obvious is the intensification of the collection of direct 
taxes. The place of income tax as a source of government revenue has 
fallen drastically in the seventies from contributing 22 per cent to total 
revenue in 1971/72 to 7 per cent in 1977/78 (Table 5.1) despite a rise in 
the circulation of currency. This reflects a high incidence of tax 
evasion and/or a reduction in the tax rate. There is definitely a big 
potential to raise more income tax revenue.
Tax evasion has been a common practice with respect to trade taxes 
as well: smuggling has been the means. The most affected taxes have been
import and export duties. Everything remaining the same, the reduction of 
smuggling would definitely increase government revenue from trade taxes.
In addition to tightening .border and customs controls, the most effective 
way to reduce smuggling is to devalue the grossly overvalued Uganda 
currency; however, it must be understood that devaluation is justified
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primarily to improve the balance of payments rather than to reduce 
smuggling.
The. government can raise more revenue also by selling to the 
private sector some of the businesses that are now run by the government - 
they total more than 129 companies and public bodies (Montsi, 1979a, p.113); 
most of these businesses were taken over by the government after they had 
been abandoned by the non-Ugandan Asians who were expelled from the country 
by the Amin regime in 1972.
Probably the biggest opportunity which the Uganda government has 
to raise more revenue is to sell to the public foreign credits which are 
coming into the country in the form of foreign aid. These credits ought 
to be auctioned or sold at a market rate (not the prevailing over valued 
exchange rate) with the profits going to the government.
The four forementioned sources of revenue would definitely 
increase government revenue substantially above the current level in order 
to narrow down the budget deficit; the rest of the deficit would then be 
eliminated by cuts in government spending.
Government spending* - There are several ways in which the Uganda government 
can cut down its expenditures. Perhaps the most immediate action is for 
the Ministry of Finance to systematically exercise tougher control on 
expenditures of government departments in order to reduce waste in government 
administration.^- The government should also suspend development projects 
which are not of vital importance to the stabilisation and rehabilitation 
programs; an alternative to suspension is to hand them over to domestic or
1 The Commonwealth team of experts which visited Uganda after the over­
throw of the Amin regime reports that there had been deliberate and 
consistent deviation from the principles and practice of financial 
administration during the period of the military regime (Richardson, 
1976b, p.299); this inevitably led to the squandering of government 
finance.
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foreign private businessmen. Only quick-yielding projects should be 
continued. The government should also review its subsidy programs and 
reduce or eliminate some subsidies, particularly the consumption type, 
which are not terribly important to the success of the stabilisation and
t
rehabilitation programs.
In its endeavour to cut expenditures, the government should be 
aware that real spending is already low; for example, in 1978/79 real 
government expenditure was only one third of the 1970/71 real expenditure 
(Table 5.2). This aggravates further the austerity arising from cuts in 
nominal government expenditures; on the other hand it reflects the need 
to raise more revenue rather than to cut expenditures in order to balance 
the budget.
Regulating government spending - The commitment to a balanced budget would 
be facilitated very much if an inbuilt system to regulate government 
revenue and expenditure were established.^  Uganda's government revenue 
is liable to annual fluctuations which tend to arise from changes in the 
terms of trade (international prices), changes in domestic production and 
changes in the flow of foreign aid. Given that government revenue leans 
heavily on revenue from trade taxes (mainly coffee export tax; see Table 
5.1), any change in international prices is likely to cause some variation 
in government revenue. Changes in domestic production as well are likely 
to cause some variation in government revenue through changes in the tax 
base; agricultural production in Uganda fluctuates with weather changes 
while mineral production varies with mineral investment cycles - high 
output in the mineral exploitation phase and low to zero output in the
1 Such a system would also contribute to a steady expansion of aggregate 
demand.
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mineral exhaustion phase. Fluctuations in government revenue are also
likely to arise from variations in the flow of foreign aid; it is very
probable that Uganda will get more foreign aid during the period of
rehabilitation than in the period thereafter.
Fluctuations in government revenue are likely to be transmitted
to government spending if the government maintains its commitment to
balancing the budget; fluctuations in government spending cause instability
in the economy and, hence, are undesirable. In addition they are likely
to undermine the commitment to a balanced budget.
One of the most effective ways to overcome fluctuations in
budget transactions is to establish an external revenue stabilisation fund 
1(ERSF). This fund should be made to accommodate all the export tax 
revenue and foreign aid (in grants and loans). Then the assets of the 
fund can be released, for government spending, only at that rate which is 
consistent with a steady growth of public expenditure. The fund ought to 
be managed by a competent bureaucracy; this bureaucracy should be able to 
make long-term projections on the income flow into the fund and likewise 
determine how much of the fund assets are to flow into the Treasury for 
public spending.
The incorporation of foreign aid in the ERSF ensures that foreign
aid is spent on programs of national priority whose merits are judged
3within the budgetary framework. External debts should be serviced from
1 Such a fund already exists in Papua New Guinea as a Mineral Resources 
Stabilisation Fund (Garnaut, 1977). The fund has facilitated the 
Papua New Guinean government to contain the international copper price 
fluctuations and to make a better use of copper revenue than either 
Chile or Zambia have done.
2 The channelling of foreign aid into the ERSF may pose problems of,
particularly, aid administration by donors: aid donors commonly
prefer to direct their aid to projects, and more so in the Ugandan 
case where donors can gain the superficial impression that the greatest 
need is for aid in the framework of projects related to the rehabilit­
ation of the economy. Hence the Ugandan Authorities should pertake
to convince the aid donors of the desirability of receiving aid and 
planning for its disbursement within the budgetary framework rather 
than within a projects framework.
3 Quite often a country will be very pleased if it is offered free a new 
television station or a new parliament even if it is much less useful 
than other activities with similar costs, and aid offers which are 
considered outside the budgetary framework will appear to be free 
(Garnaut, 1977).
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this fund as well. The same fund should ensure a steady rehabilitation 
and development thereafter. Moreover, the experience gained from the 
price stabilisation funds of coffee and cotton could be exploited for the
better management of the proposed ERSF.
5.2.2 Monetary Policy
Budgetary restrictions ought to be reinforced by other 
means to reduce money supply. There are several ways through which
the central bank of Uganda can reduce money supply or the velocity 
of circulation of money, using the powers given it in the Bank of 
Uganda Act (IMF, 1969, pp. 340-51). The most immediate perhaps is 
to raise interest rates on deposits sufficiently to compensate for the 
now-negative real interest rates; this measure is aimed at attracting to 
the bank the currency now circulating in large amounts. The central bank 
should also restrict bank credit by raising the interest rate on bank 
advances, raising the minimum liquid asset reserve requirement and increasing 
qualitative control on bank credit.'*' Qualitative control can be done by 
selectively stopping long-term loans, overdrafts and credits to finance 
debts to government, selectively restricting short-term credit, and 
selectively imposing credit ceilings. Another effective measure for 
reducing money supply is to require importers to deposit an advance payment, 
for imports, with the central bank for a certain specified period. And
1 Implicit in qualitative control of bank credit is the rationing of credit; 
preference in the provision of credit should be given to the key areas 
of the economy on which the success of the stabilisation and 
rehabilitation programs depends. It should also be borne in mind that 
qualitative control on bank credit is an inferior method of regulating 
money supply because it discourages competition among the banks and 
among the bank customers, and might therefore reduce efficiency in the 
banking system and in production, respectively. Qualitative control 
measures, if used, should be very temporary for that matter.
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finally the government ought to consider the establishment of a bond market; 
then the central bank can reduce money supply through open market operations.
Perhaps a possible threat to the control of money supply may come 
from the foreign reserves; to guard against such a threat, all the money in 
the coffee and cotton price stabilisation funds and in the proposed ERSF 
should be kept in foreign exchange with the central bank, and sterilised or 
neutralised so that it does not affect the money supply.
The monetary authorities, in their effort to curb the growth in 
money supply, must bear in mind that real money supply has been decreasing 
with increasing inflation: for example in March 1979, the level of real
money supply had fallen below the 1970 level (Table 5.2) despite a stagnant 
real GDP.'*' As inflationary expectations stabilise, there may occur a 
shortage of liquidity to finance business transactions. The authorities 
might have to ease monetary policy with the recovery of the economy.
The anti-inflation measures discussed to this point deal with
inflation whose source is domestic; they leave imported inflation unchecked.
And yet, since Uganda has an open economy and, more important, imports all
the oil it needs, its economy is very vulnerable to international inflation.
A standard instrument for use against imported inflation is the exchange
rate: a revaluation of the domestic currency to counter-check the rise
in the level of international prices. However, the use of this instrument
presupposes a balance of payments surplus. Since Uganda has a serious
balance of payments problem and an over-valued currency, it cannot opt for
this instrument in the near future; it has first to resolve its balance of
payments crisis meanwhile concentrating its effort on reducing its inflation
1 The fall in real money supply does not imply a reduction in economic 
transactions, of course. The fall was more than compensated for by 
the rise in the velocity of money circulation or else inflation would 
not have occurred.
Ill
rate to the level of the international rate of inflation. Even within 
these limits, the inflation rate target of not more than 20 per cent per 
year is definitely attainable if the restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
is adequately implemented. After the two years of stabilisation and 
rehabilitation, the balance of payments situation should have improved to 
such an extent as to allow the implementation of a hard currency strategy - 
to keep the level of international reserves high so that the Uganda shilling 
can be appreciated at a rate equivalent to the rate of increase of inter­
national prices. This would facilitate Uganda to attain a rate of 
inflation lower than the rate of international inflation.
The use of restrictive monetary and fiscal policy as an anti­
inflation measure aims at reducing aggregate demand. This in turn may 
reduce the excess demand for labour to equate demand and supply of labour 
at the prevailing real wage. The fall in the price level accruing from a 
reduction in aggregate demand may also raise the real wage, hence also 
working towards equating demand and supply of labour.'*' Hence the anti­
inflation policy also contributes to full-employment. However, the primary 
goal of fiscal and monetary policy still remains price stability.
5.3 Full Employment
The full employment target is being pursued from a starting 
position of a shortage of labour co-existing with unemployment of which a 
substantial amount is voluntary. The instruments deployed in the pursuit
1 This assumes that the price level declines faster than the decline in 
money wage. That money wage declines slowly, if it declines at all, 
is very realistic since, more often than not, money wages are rigid 
downwards.
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are wage-fixing (incomes policy) and the reduction of frictions in the 
labour market.
5.3.1 Wage-Fixing (Incomes Policy)
The wages and salaries commission is the organ that fixes and 
reviews wages and salaries. To attain full employment, the commission 
should restrain upward movements of money wage rates in those particular 
sectors where there are no shortages of manpower and should allow upward 
movements where these are needed to attract or retain labour to meet actual 
or expected manpower shortages. With reference to the current situation 
in Uganda, there is a severe shortage of unskilled labour in tea estates 
and sugar cane plantations; there is a strong case for the money wages of 
the unskilled workers in these sectors to be increased in order to attract 
and also retain labour to meet at least the prevailing man-power shortage. 
It is also arguable that the prevailing Shs.240 monthly minimum (but also 
de facto maximum in most cases) money wage is too low to attract unskilled 
labour into wage employment: it is advisable that this wage be increased
to meet the labour shortages in the formal sector. However, the wage­
fixing authorities should bear in mind that the real wages are going to 
rise with declining inflation provided the anti-inflation policy works and 
money wages stay fixed; hence the awarding of money wage increases should 
take into consideration the expected rise in real wages accruing from the
1 Using the money wage rate (wage-fixing) to attain full-employment, and 
demand management to attain price stability is a clear reversal of the 
Keynesian gospel; the Keynesians use demand management to influence the 
level of real output and employment, and money wage rate to influence 
money prices. The diversion from the Keynesian gospel is not new at 
all; Meade (1978) in his Nobel Prize Lecture on the meaning of internal 
balance advocates the use of demand management to influence money prices, 
and money wage rate to influence the real level of output and employment.
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decline in inflation - this suggests the introduction of wage indexation.
5.3.2 Reducing Frictions in the Labour Market
The reduction of frictions in the labour market as a means to 
attain full employment materialises by reducing the time and costs involved 
in obtaining information about employment opportunities.
In Uganda, information about employment opportunities is 
inadequate; only the high executive jobs are adequately advertised in 
newspapers; moreover, the circulation of newspapers is only assured in 
urban and town centres. Apart from the Public Service Commission, situated 
in the capital city, where enquiries about employment in the public service 
can be made, there is hardly any other organised place which takes care of 
employment coordination. Hence job-seekers are left to go from employer 
to employer looking for jobs; this exercise is definitely time-consuming 
and costly too. Costly as well is the travelling to and from the capital 
city to enquire with the Public Service Commission about employment; this 
may also contribute to rural-urban migration.
To reduce the time and costs involved in obtaining information
about employment opportunities, it is important for the government to
devise means of making available at low cost the best information possible
on jobs, including a description of the position, its geographical location,
and its salary range. This could be done by establishing an employment
office, with branches in different districts, to take charge of these
responsibilities; through the use of mass media - radio, newspapers,
1 Although the workers always welcome an upward wage indexation (a rise 
in money wage to compensate for inflation), they strenuously resist a 
downward wage indexation; therefore they condition money wages to be 
flexible upwards but inflexible downwards. So, when wages are in­
creased to compensate for inflation, the increase should be modest in 
order to take account of the downward inflexibility of money wages in 
the wake of a decline in the level of prices.
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television and others, the office should be able to make available at low 
cost the best information possible on jobs.
Of importance too is rural-urban migration which may flood the 
urban areas with rural migrants who exceed the number of jobs available, 
thus causing urban unemployment. Although, during the military regime 
of Amin, the flow of migration appears to have reversed, that is, labour 
migrating from urban to rural areas and neighbouring countries, the trend 
is likely to change with the recovery of the modern sector: rural-urban
migration will take place once more unless appropriate steps are taken to 
control it. The primary cause of rural-urban migration is the real wage 
differential between rural and urban employment. A first step towards 
the control of rural-urban migration, therefore, is to regulate the real 
wage differential such that migration proceeds at a rate commensurate with 
the rate of job creation in urban areas. In addition, a rural-bias 
ought to be introduced in project evaluation so that economic projects are 
located in rural areas closer to the majority of the population, provided 
this does not call for a significant trade-off in the social profitability 
of the projects.
5.4 External Balance
In the two years of stabilisation and rehabilitation, the target 
of the external balance objective is the external equilibrium.^ In the 
analysis that follows, the target will be pursued with two simultaneous 
and consistent approaches: one approach aims at the balance on the current
1 External equilibrium is defined here as a balance of payments situation 
where (planned) autonomous payments equal (planned) autonomous receipts 
so that there is no change in the international reserves. In this
case, external balance and external equilibrium coincide. After the
two years of stabilisation policy, external balance as an objective will 
have a balance of payments surplus as its target (see Table 4.1).
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account as the target and the other approach aims at the balance on the 
capital account as the target. The former ignores short and long term 
capital movements; it then uses absorption and switching to attain external 
balance. The latter is used to supplement the current account approach 
to achieve external equilibrium by allowing for capital movements. Both 
approaches together are directed at reducing Uganda's balance of payments 
deficit to zero so that autonomous payments equate autonomous receipts.
5.4.1 The Current Account or Absorption-Switching Approach 
Absorption and switching have now come to be regarded as instru­
ments for attaining external balance while maintaining internal balance."*' 
Starting from a balance of payments deficit, a combination of disabsorption 
and switching can work to provide a surplus or reduce a deficit on the 
current account.
Disabsorption, the reduction of aggregate demand, was recommended
for deployment in the anti-inflation policy. Since anti-inflation and
external balance strategies are being pursued simultaneously, disabsorption,
2henceforth, will be taken as given. We shall, therefore, proceed with 
the switching component to attain the external balance objective. The 
switching that is needed for the attainment of external balance from a 
situation of balance of payments deficit ought to "... raise the domestic
1 See for example Corden (1977, pp.7-34) for an exposition of the theory 
and the relevant references on the subject.
2 Disabsorption contributes to external balance in two ways:
(i) it makes the switching effect stick; without disabsorption, the 
rise in the price of tradeables relative to non-tradeables would 
be negated by the rise in the price of non-tradeables induced by 
a rise in aggregate demand; and
(ii) it induces a reduction in the demand for imports, hence less
expenditure on imports; it also induces a reduction in demand for 
exportables, hence releasing more for export. The fall in imports 
together with a rise in exports improve the current account balance.
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price of tradeables relative to the price of non-tradeables, and so cause 
patterns of production and of absorption to switch. On the production 
side, resources will be induced to move out of production of non-traded 
goods into production of exportables and importables .... On the demand 
side the rise in the relative price of tradeables will shift the pattern of 
absorption away from tradeables and towards non-tradeables ... ." (Corden,
1977, p.10). The implication of switching to Uganda's economy is that 
both demand and production patterns would favour the production of export­
ables (mainly coffee, cotton, tea and copper) and importables (mainly sugar, 
tobacco and most of the manufactures) at the expense of non-tradeables 
mainly (staple foods, and services); such a switch would reverse the current 
production trend where resources have switched from the production of 
traditional exports and import-competing products to the production of 
food products whose prices are domestically determined. By so doing, more 
exports are supplied while less imports are demanded; hence a surplus 
on the current account is generated.
Alternative switching instruments - There are several instruments 
that have at one time or other been used to do the switching job; they are:
(i) devaluation; (ii) tariffs; (iii) tariff-cum-export subsidies; (iv) export 
subsidies; (v) quantitative restrictions; (vi) export production subsidy- 
cum-consumption taxes, and (vii) advance deposits on imports. These 
instruments vary in the degree of effectiveness and in the magnitude of the 
costs involved. Corden's assessment scheme outlined early in the chapter 
can be used to rank these instruments in their order of merit giving 
preference to that instrument which achieves the policy target with the 
least cost; then a hierarchy of instruments can be drawn. Four simplifying
assumptions are made, namely:
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"(1) Subsidies can be financed by non-distorting taxes;
(2) taxation involves no collection costs;
(3) there are no costs of disbursement of subsidies; and
(4) the income distribution effects of various policies 
(such as the redistribution from tax payers to 
subsidy recipients) can be neglected" (Corden, 1974, 
p . 42).1 23
The hierarchy of instruments - Under this instrument assessment
scheme, a diagnosis of the instruments produces a hierarchy of instruments
summarised in Chart 5.1. Two instruments come out in the first-best
2category - a devaluation and a uniform tariff-cum-export subsidy; they
have zero by-product distortions. The rest of the instruments come out
in the second-best category; they have two by-product distortions each:
consumption distortions and a home-market bias are caused by tariffs,
advance deposits on imports and quantitative restrictions while consumption
distortions and a pro-trade bias are caused by export subsidies and export
3production subsidy-cum-consumption taxes.
Although an export subsidy-cum-tariff is equivalent to a
devaluation under the four assumptions made, a devaluation is preferable to
4an export subsidy-cum-tariff, when the assumptions are removed, because 
the latter has tax collection costs, revenue-raising distortion costs and
1 Corden (1974, pp.42-57) reviews and discusses these assumptions pointing 
out their weaknesses.
2 Given the four assumptions made, a devaluation is equivalent to an export 
subsidy-cum-tariff: a devaluation of x per cent is equivalent to an x 
per cent tariff on all imports coupled with an x per cent subsidy on all 
exports.
3 Pro-trade bias means a switch only to foreign markets while home market- 
bias means a switch only to domestic markets; a non-distorting switching 
instrument ought to switch to foreign markets for exportables while 
switching to domestic markets for importables.
In fact these assumptions are unrealistic and could as well be removed; 
see Corden (1974, pp.42-57) for a discussion on the unrealism of the 
assumptions.
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CHART 5.1
THE HIERARCHY OF SWITCHING POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Rank Policy Instruments By-Product Distortions
First-best (1) (a)
(b)
Devaluation 
Export subsidy- 
cum-tariff
None
None
Second-best (2) (a) Tariff 1- Home-market bias
2- Consumption
distortion
(b) Export subsidy 1- Pro-trade bias
2- Consumption
distortion
(c) Quantitative 
restrictions on 
imports
1- Home-market bias
2- Consumption
distortion
(d) Advance deposits 
on imports
1- Home-market bias
2- Consumption
distortion
(e) Export pro­
duction subsidy- 
cum-consumption 
tax
1- Pro-trade bias
2- Consumption
distortion
subsidy disbursement costs in contrast to a devaluation which has none.
Therefore a devaluation stands out as the only first-best instrument of
the switching policy. In the current Uganda where "temptations for
improper exercise of influence, corruption and profiteering are usually
too great to resist" (Helleiner, 1979, p.270), devaluation becomes even
more preferable since it is free of these social evils unlike the other
policy instruments; it is even much easier to put into effect since it
does not have to be discussed in and enacted by parliament.^“
1 The decision to devalue the currency can be taken by the central bank 
authorities in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance.
119
Devaluation and external balance - As the first-best switching 
instrument, devaluation contributes to the achievement of external balance 
through the switching effect. Besides the switching effect, devaluation 
contributes to external balance through its effect on absorption. A 
devaluation is inflationary; by raising the price level, a devaluation 
reduces real cash balances. The people then save in order to restore the 
real value of their cash balances (Dornbusch, 1973). By so doing, they 
reduce absorption. The disabsorption accruing from devaluation reinforces 
the disabsorption arising from the disabsorption policy. Bearing in mind 
the disabsorption effect of a devaluation, disabsorption induced by the 
disabsorption policy ought to be planned such that it is less than it would 
otherwise be without a devaluation.
Devaluation may also contribute to external balance through its 
effect on foreign aid especially in the less developed countries (LDCs): 
from a study covering 23 devaluations by 10 LDCs during the fifties and 
sixties, Krueger (1978) discovered that, on average, devaluation is followed 
by a striking increase in foreign aid. The reason she put forward was 
that increased aid'is often made conditional on steps by the recipient 
towards "getting its house in order". At a time when Uganda badly needs 
foreign aid for the rehabilitation of its economy, devaluation becomes 
almost indispensable. It is probably important that income distribution 
effects of a devaluation be known. A devaluation raises the incomes of 
the factors specific to or intensive in the production of tradeables 
relative to the non-tradeables (Corden, 1978, p.14); labour employed in the 
service sector, including public service, is the major victim of a 
devaluation. The other group of losers from a devaluation are those who
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are vulnerable to government cuts in spending; these are likely to be the 
subsidy recipients and/or those persons who are vulnerable to staff 
ceilings and staff cuts in the public sector.
5.4.2 External Balance with Allowance for Capital Flows
The absorption-switching approach, which has just been discussed, 
aims at achieving a surplus or reducing a deficit on the current account.
The external balance objective, however, is to balance the autonomous 
payments with the autonomous receipts on the balance of payments account 
as a whole. This involves not only the current account but also the 
capital account with its capital flows. Hence, in addition to the 
absorption-switching approach for the current account, a device is required 
to deal with capital flows such that a net capital inflow or a reduction on 
net capital outflow is achieved.
The main determinant of capital flows between countries is the
2real interest rate differential. However, there are other factors which 
might be equally influential, namely, economic stability especially the 
stability of commodity prices, exchange rate and real wages, political 
stability and the conduciveness of foreign investment law to foreign 
investors. Capital flows respond to the differential in real interest 
rates only if there is macro-economic and political stability. Therefore, 
Uganda's effort ought to be directed at solving its macro-economic and 
political stabilisation problems; the differential in real interest rates 
will be taken care of by the anti-inflation policy which has already been 
outlined.
1 In order for a devaluation to be effective, it must be backed by a 
reduction in absorption; the latter is most likely to involve cuts in 
government spending.
2 For a good exposition on the influence of real interest rate differential 
on capital flows, see Mundell (1962).
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CHAPTER 6
REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter, an outline of rehabilitation and development is 
drawn in the light of macro-economic stabilisation. With respect to 
rehabilitation, the ultimate goal is to rebuild the production capacity of 
the economy so that it can support an economic growth rate of 6 per cent 
per year; a rehabilitation strategy to meet this goal is drawn. This 
strategy is to be implemented concurrently with the implementation of the
stabilisation policy discussed in the previous chapter. However, 
stabilisation takes precedence over rehabilitation.
As regards development, the objective is to lift the rate of 
investment in order to consolidate the production potential which ought to 
improve and sustain the rate of economic growth attained by the rehabilitation 
effort, while generating high employment and redressing inequalities in the 
distribution of incomes, wealth and services between persons and regions.
A long-term strategy of macro-economic stabilisation is also designed in 
order to create a healthy environment conducive to development.
6.1 Rehabilitation
The first step towards rehabilitation is the implementation of 
the stabilisation policy which was discussed in the previous chapter. In 
brief, the stabilisation policy is to be implemented through launching a 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policy so as to curb inflation and check 
Magendo, devaluing the Uganda shilling sufficiently to attain a realistic 
exchange rate, revising money wages in order to equate supply and demand
for labour, and reducing frictions in the labour market in order to cut
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down the time and costs involved in obtaining information about employment 
opportunities. The stabilisation policy is a necessary condition for 
rehabilitation.
When policy measures were being derived from the internal and 
external balance model in Chapter 4, rehabilitation was interpreted as a 
restoration of the production capacity of the economy to the 1970 level.
At that level, the rate of growth of real GDP was averaging 5.3 per cent 
(2.4 per cent per capita growth rate) annually for the period 1960-70, with 
an .accompanying high level of employment. That level is to be restored 
from the current production capacity which sustains a real GDP growth rate 
of -0.3 per cent (per capita growth rate of -3.5 per cent) - a growth rate 
for the period 1970-76.'*'
The general requirements of the rehabilitation strategy can be 
explained with reference to the three sector model in Chapter 3. In this 
model, capital stock and technological knowledge are held constant in the 
short-run while labour and complementary inputs are varied. However, 
during the period 1971-79 the depreciation of capital stock, the deterior­
ation in technological knowledge and skills, and the scarcity of comple­
mentary inputs led to a decline in the production capacity of the Ugandan 
economy. The rehabilitation of the production capacity would require a 
reversal of the 1971-79 trend: the rebuilding of capital stock, the
improvement in and uplift of technological knowledge and skills, and the 
provision of adequate production inputs complementary to labour.
The rehabilitation strategy - The rehabilitation thrust must 
definitely come from the government of Uganda; it has to be in the form
1 In fact the current production capacity is likely to be lower than this 
because of the destruction of the capital stock by the Liberation War 
and looting.
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of public projects and policy measures which maximise the participation of 
the private sector in the rehabilitation of the economy. These policy 
measures operate within the context of macro-economic stabilisation.
Fiscal policy - The government is faced with the task of raising 
more funds from the domestic private sector and foreign sources with which 
to effect rehabilitation through direct spending on projects related to 
the rehabilitation program and through the provision of subsidies to the 
sectors of the economy which are critical to the success of the rehabilitation 
program. However, the fiscal policy must be non-inflationary.
Credit policy - Through a selective use of quantitative and 
qualitative controls on commercial banks by the central bank, credit should 
be channelled to areas of the economy which are vital to the success of the 
rehabilitation program while money supply is kept on a steady, non­
inflationary, rate of growth.
Foreign aid policy - As a matter of priority, the government 
should negotiate with Uganda's creditors for a moratorium on the U.S.$120 
Million external debt (five times the value of reserves); payment should be 
deferred for at least two years. In addition, the government should 
launch an extensive call for foreign aid - grants and soft loans.'*'
Foreign aid is required to cover the savings gap and the budget deficit 
necessary for the accomplishment of the rehabilitation program.
However, it is important to note that increased aid is often made con­
ditional on steps by the recipient towards "getting its house in order" 
(Krueger, 1978), thus emphasizing the importance of macro-economic 
stabilisation to the rehabilitation of the economy.
1 Soft loans in the sense of bearing an interest rate below the market 
rate and/or repayable after long periods.
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Direct foreign investment policy - Foreign investment should be 
encouraged particularly in the sectors which use intensively capital, 
technology and managerial and organisation know-how - the factors of 
production which Uganda lacks; these sectors are mainly manufacturing and 
mining. Consideration should be given to joint ventures; a partnership 
arrangement, in which private foreign capital is associated with local 
private or public capital, should be encouraged because it encourages and 
protects private foreign investment while stimulating local investment.
In.particular, there are industries which the Amin regime nationalised 
after the expulsion of the non-Ugandan Asians in 1972; an industry by 
industry assessment should be made to find out which industries the Uganda 
government can run jointly with the former owners or new interested parties. 
The policy on foreign investment calls for a new foreign investment law 
which is conducive to foreign investment while stimulating local investment. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that foreign investment depends much 
on the level of political stability and on the extent to which effort is 
being put into solving macro-economic stabilisation problems.
The Key Areas for Rehabilitation
Although virtually the whole economy is to be rehabilitated, 
there are critical sectors of the economy where greatest attention ought to 
be focused. First the agricultural sector; on the whole, the success of 
the rehabilitation strategy depends on a quick recovery of the agricultural 
sector. Within the sector, the return to normal production and marketing 
of coffee, cotton and tea would provide export earnings to meet the import 
requirements and a gradual but steady repayment of overdue external debts 
while injecting into the economy that income needed to revive the economic 
activities; the return to normal production of sugar and tobacco would save
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on foreign exchange needed for the importation of machinery and equipment 
for the industrial sector. Therefore, the production of tradeables in 
agriculture is of critical importance to the rehabilitation strategy.
Another area of importance to rehabilitation is the transport 
system - mainly the road and railway systems which are essential for the 
marketing of commodities and the distribution of inputs and consumer goods; 
it requires immediate attention. Within the marketing system as well are 
the co-operative unions; they take charge of the marketing operation of the 
main agricultural products. However, they are now almost inoperational 
due to shortages of liquidity and transport means, and other problems.
They require cash to stand on their feet again. The same cash requirement 
applies to the processors of agricultural produce.
Important as well is the rehabilitation of those industries which 
produce goods that are key inputs to agricultural production; most notable 
are the hand hoe industry and the fertiliser industry. The speedy recovery 
of these key industries could be facilitated if the government arranged 
for a joint ownership with a reputable foreign firm.
6.2 Development
There are two parts to the argument on development; the first 
part provides an outline of a development strategy, and the second part 
sets out a long-term strategy for macro-economic stabilisation which creates 
a healthy environment conducive to development.
The Development Strategy
It was argued in Chapter 4 that the post-rehabilitation 
development should be effected through high rates of economic growth and 
employment, and equity. Before embarking on a development strategy, it
is important to review some aspects of Uganda's past development record
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in order to define the starting position; information on relative and 
absolute poverty could give some insight into the level of Uganda's 
development.
In 1970 Uganda's income distribution was fair by international 
standards: using a familiar technique to measure inequality by the extent
to which the income share of groups of individuals or households differs 
from their population share, Uganda was classified in the low inequality 
category of LDCs with income shares for the lowest 40 per cent averaging 
17 .per cent and above (Ahluwalia, 1974; reprinted in Meier, 1976, Table 1, 
p.19).^ However, inequality during the seventies must have grown with 
the uncompensated inflation and the deterioration in economic growth.
Although income distribution was fair in 1970, absolute poverty 
was nevertheless substantial: in 1969, 21.3 per cent of Uganda's
population was living below the poverty line of annual per capita income 
of U.S.$50 (in 1971 prices) (Ahluwalia, ibid.; reprinted in Meier, 1976,
Table 4, pp.22-3). Again the percentage of the population below the 
poverty line has increased substantially through the seventies with declining 
economic growth.
In designing a strategy for development, it may be of interest
to note the relationship that exists between economic growth and income
distribution. Adelman (1975) carried out a study on 43 underdeveloped
countries from which he derived this relationship between economic growth
2and income distribution: .
1 Uganda's income share of the lowest 40 per cent was 17.1 per cent, 35.8 
per cent for the middle 40 per cent, and 47.1 per cent for the top 20 
per cent (ibid.; Table 1, p.19).
2 A cross-sectional analysis of this type may be accused of too much 
aggregation; the results therefrom may thus be thought not extremely 
applicable to a particular country. The results of a study covering 
only one country over time are not applicable to another country either
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"1- Real rates of per capita economic growth below 3.5 
per cent tend to be associated with declines in the 
share of income of the poor. At current rates of 
population growth, this puts the minimum required 
growth rate of real GNP around 5.5 per cent.
2- Higher rates of growth are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for substantial improvements 
in the share of income of the poor.
3- High growth rates tend to lead to improvements in 
the income of the poorest 40 per cent of the 
population only if accompanied by a human-resource­
intensive development strategy pursued within a not 
sharply dualistic growth pattern" (ibid.; reprinted 
in Meier, 1976, p.31).
One can conclude from Adelman's findings that a strategy against absolute 
and relative poverty should at least aim at a minimum growth rate of real 
GNP of 5.5 per cent accompanied by a human-resource-intensive development 
strategy while also reducing dualistic growth patterns. Drawing Uganda's 
development strategy on these lines, the development effort should be 
directed at achieving an economic growth rate of at least 6.0 per cent, 
investing in human resources and then using them intensively in the 
development program, and developing all sectors of the economy in a manner
2 (Cont'd)
unless the two countries are very similar; for example, the development 
experience of Taiwan or South Korea is not directly translatable to 
Uganda. Even if two countries may be thought not dissimilar, each 
country must definitely have some unique characteristics. This being 
the case, the results of a study covering many countries may prove the 
better of the two evils when designing a development strategy for a 
particular country. However, the whole exercise must be done with 
wariness.
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that reduces regional and sectoral differences in incomes, wealth and 
services.
The Long-Term Strategy for Macro-Economic Stabilisation
It is very necessary that a healthy environment be created to 
pave the way for development. The success of the development strategy 
just discussed is subject to a lasting stability in the economy. Such a 
stability is only likely if the macro-economic stabilisation fabric is 
institutionalised; such a step is a necessary condition to counter-check 
moves by irresponsible governments of the Amin type directed at solving 
short-term political and economic crises at the expense of long-term 
economic stability. The expression of the main pillars of macro-economic 
policy in clear rules and institutional relationships keeps aloof the game 
of macro-economic policy from the ad hoc and often confused game of politics 
not uncommon to Uganda.
The institutionalisation of some aspects of macro-economic policy 
has been done in Uganda only with respect to stabilising village incomes; 
this has been attained through the establishment by legislation of coffee 
and cotton price stabilisation funds. Added to this should be the 
legislation of the proposed ERSF to stabilise budgetary transactions so 
that government expenditures are kept in line with government revenue and 
on a path of steady growth. The assets of the funds can be effectively 
sterilised in a central bank account (or less effectively in government 
accounts if invested in government securities). Alternatively, when 
prospects for the balance of payments are strong and for investment weak, 
some part of their assets might usefully be held as deposits with the 
commercial banks. By so doing, possible destabilising effects of the fund
assets to monetary stabilisation are safeguarded against.
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Very important as well is the establishment of a Budget Priorities 
Committee (BPC) to make recommendations, to the government, on the merits 
of short and long term expenditure programs in the light of government 
priorities; this would ensure that any growth in revenue would be allocated 
to carefully considered high priority programs. The establishment of a 
BPC is a necessary condition in Uganda's desperate situation where projects 
for rehabilitation and development are not few at all.
Uganda needs a long-term stabilisation strategy, very clear to 
all. people - technocrats, politicians and the public alike. The strategy 
has to be simple and free from manipulation by interest groups. An 
appropriate one is the balanced budget-cum-hard currency strategy. This 
strategy involves targeting government expenditure to government revenue 
as an assurance against domestic inflation, and using the exchange rate as 
a shield against international inflation. The balanced budget commitment 
is facilitated by the legislation to establish the ERSF which is a budget 
stabiliser. The use of the exchange rate as a shield against international 
inflation operates through the revaluation of the Uganda shilling at a rate 
equal to the rate o'f increase in the level of international prices. This 
exchange rate strategy depends on a high degree of restraint in relation 
to money wages and government expenditure. Thus the success of the exchange 
rate strategy depends on the commitment to balancing the budget. Therefore, 
it is important that the balanced budget strategy goes hand in hand with 
the exchange rate strategy, hence called balanced budget-cum-hard currency
strategy.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to devise macro-economic policies 
and strategies to support the effort at rehabilitation of the Ugandan 
economy following the literation of the country in April 1979 by the 
Tanzanian army backed by the Ugandan exiles. The economic mismanagement 
by the military regime of Amin left the Ugandan economy with negative 
growth, run-away inflation and chronic external deficits. Then the 
Liberation War, in which the Amin regime was toppled, and the subsequent 
looting left the country in a disastrous situation not dissimilar to that 
of Western Europe after the Second World War.
Following the analysis of the principal markets of the Ugandan 
economy, it was found that the money market was characterised, in the 
seventies, by a rapid growth of money supply originating from the government's 
expansionary fiscal policy; the rapid growth of money supply was transmitted 
to the commodity market in the form of a rapid rise in prices; the latter 
eroded the real exchange rate and the real wages; and blackmarketeering and 
smuggling became the business of the day.
On the production side, the traditional export crops - coffee, 
cotton and tea, and the import-competing crops - sugar and tobacco, declined 
in production as resources shifted from their production towards the pro­
duction of food crops whose prices were coping with inflation; the over­
valued Uganda shilling had anti-protected tradeables vis a 1 vis non- 
tradeables. The production of food, however, stagnated.
Industrial production dwindled as well; both manufacturing and
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mining, in 1978, hardly realised 50 per cent of the 1970 level of 
production.
The decline in production of tradeables got transmitted to the 
balance of payments account; the outcome was an accumulation of balance of 
payments deficits and external debts.
Chapter 3 searched for an appropriate framework to analyse the 
macro-economic stabilisation problems of the Ugandan economy; eventually, 
Garnaut's model of internal and external balance was recruited and stream­
lined to Uganda's economic features. Following the application of the 
model to the Ugandan economy, it was found that there had been a shift 
in the internal and external balance curves during the seventies; the shift 
had been caused primarily by a decline in productivity. The economy was 
placed in Zone IV of the internal and external balance diagram (Figure 3.8) 
featuring inflation and balance of payments deficits, at a low level of production. 
Another model of employment, real wages and productivity was designed to 
trace the path of sectoral adjustment to changes in economic activities; 
it was found that output and employment declined in the economy as a whole; 
however, output declined more in the modern sector than in the village 
sector.
By exploiting the adjustment mechanism of Garnaut's model to 
changes in productivity, it was made possible to devise macro-economic 
policies and strategies to support the effort at rehabilitation of the 
Ugandan economy; the policies and strategies were classified into three 
categories: stabilisation, rehabilitation and development. The first
two were planned for the short-run (two years) and the last one for the 
long-run (five years). With respect to stabilisation, three policy 
objectives were set, namely, price-level stability (anti-inflation), full
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employment and external balance. As regards rehabilitation, the strategy 
was to restore the production capacity which had been lost in the seventies. 
And in regard to development, the strategy was to boost the production 
potential of the economy so as to support a high rate of economic growth 
(at least 6 per cent per year) with high employment and equity; a long-term 
strategy of macro-economic stabilisation was devised to back up the 
development strategy.
In the pursuit of stabilisation policy, restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policy were used primarily as anti-inflation weapons; devaluation 
was judged a first-best switching instrument to attain external balance, 
supplemented by a rise in interest rates and political and economic 
stability to induce capital inflows; and an incomes policy and the re­
duction of frictions in the labour market were found appropriate tools to 
attain full employment. An External Revenue Stabilisation Fund (ERSF), 
to be fed with revenue from export tax and foreign aid, was recommended 
to primarily maintain budgetary stability; the assets of the fund are to 
be released, for government spending, at such a rate as to maintain public 
expenditure on a path of steady growth.
Rehabilitation is geared at rebuilding the production capacity 
to the level that can support an economic growth of at least 6 per cent 
per year; this is to be done through the re-accumulation of capital stock, 
improvement of technological knowledge and skills, and the provision of 
inputs complementary to labour. The government is to take the lead in the 
rehabilitation of the economy through direct spending on public projects 
and through policy measures which maximise the participation of the private 
sector in the rehabilitation program. The major policy measures proposed 
are fiscal policy, credit policy and foreign aid and investment policy.
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The key areas for rehabilitation were identified as the agricultural sector, 
the transport system, the industries producing essential agricultural inputs, 
and the co-operative unions.
A development strategy was also outlined; it aims at achieving a 
minimum growth rate of real GNP of 6.0 per cent per year accompanied by a 
human-resource-intensive development strategy and a commitment to reducing 
dualistic growth patterns. And this development strategy is to be 
supported by a long-term strategy of macro-economic stabilisation; the 
latter stresses the institutionalisation of the macro-economic stabilisation 
fabric. It is strongly recommended that an External Revenue Stabilisation 
Fund (ERSF) and a Budget Priorities Committee (BPC) be established and 
legislated; the ERSF is to stabilise budgetary operations while the BPC is 
to make recommendations to the government on the merits of expenditure 
programs in order to ensure that government revenue is spent on carefully 
considered high priority programs. A balanced budget-cum-hard currency 
strategy is devised to contain domestic and imported inflation, within the 
constraint of external balance.
Throughout, it is emphasized that macro-economic stabilisation 
must take precedence over rehabilitation and development; inflation must be 
reduced and contained, and real expenditure (both public and private) kept 
on a path of steady expansion with the appropriate use of monetary and 
fiscal policy. There is little hope for rehabilitation and development 
unless inflation is brought under control, the Uganda shilling devalued to 
reflect its true real value, and the country conditioned to live within its 
means.
It ought to be stressed that this study was not meant to cover 
all aspects of rehabilitation and development of the Ugandan economy;
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rather, the crux of the study was to devise macro-economic stabilisation 
policies and strategies to support the effort at rehabilitation and 
subsequent development. To the extent that this goal has been reached, 
the study achieves what it set out to do.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
BUDGETARY OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
FROM 1961-62 TO 1978-793 
(Shs. Million)
Date Recurrent
Spending
Capital
Spending
Total
Spending
Surplus
or
Deficit (-)
1960 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1961-62 502.6 96.0 598.6 -143.1
1962-63 553.8 86.1 639.9 -37.3
1963-64 590.6 118.1 708.7 -29.0
1964-65 734.6 213.1 947.7 -107.3
1965-66 812.4 232.6 1045.0 -236.6
1966-67 861.3 229.8 1091.1 -75.0
1967-68 870.3 273.1 1143.4 -79.7
1968-69 1008.7 503.0 1511.7 -288.9
1969-70 1177.3 437.8 1615.1 -423.4
1970-71 1191.0 713.2 1904.5 -473.3
1971-72 1491.0 945.5 2436.5 -951.9
1972-73 1429.7 640.4 2114.3 -873.7
1973-74 2027.0 635.0 2662.0 -1284.0
1974-75 2429.0 832.0 3261.0 -1145.0
1975-76 2955.0 826.0 378.0 -1437.0
1976-77 3681.0 1037.0 4718.0 +1003.0
1977-78 3748.0 2044.0 5792.0 -507.0
1978-79 4131.0 1232.0 5363.0 -1313.0
Notes: n.a. not available
a Budget year starts in June and ends in June the following 
calendar year.
Source: IMF, Surveys of African Economies, Vol.2, 1969; UN, Economic
Commission for Africa: Summaries of Economic Data - Uganda,
various issues; Richardson (1979a, Table 27.1).
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
VALUES OF NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE OF 
UGANDA SHILLING PER UNIT OF SDR AND U.S. DOLLAR, 1970-78
Date
Par Rate/Market 
Rate
(U.Sh.per US$)
Market Rate/
Par or Central Rate 
(U.Sh.per SDR)
1970 7.14293 7.7551
1971 7.1429 7.7551
1972 7.1429 7.7551
1973 7.0214 8.3238
1974 7.1439 8.7466
1975 7.4122 9.6600
1976 8.3677 9.6600
1977 8.2656 9.6600
1978 7.6917 9.6600
Note: a the same exchange rate prevailed before and was
fixed.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1979
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APPENDIX TABLE 4 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCOUNT
U g a n d a
A G G R E G A T E D  P R E S E N T A T I O N  
( I n  m i l l i o n s  o f  S D R s )
1 9 7 0 —7 7
C o d e 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7
A . C u r r e n t  A c c o u n t ,  e x c l .  G r o u p  F ................................. . 1 C Z 2 0 .3 - 8 5 . 5 1 5 .1 3 6 .1 - 2 0 . 0 - 4 6 . 2 3 7 .4 5 8 .3
M e r c h a n d i s e :  e x p o r t s  f o  b ................................................ . 1 A . A  Z 2 6 1 .6 2 4 3 .2 2 4 .3 .0 2 .30  8 2 4 4 .5 1 9 5  4 2 8 0 .3 4 6 9 .2
C o f f e e .............................................................................................. . 1 A 1 A  T 1 4 2  0 1 3 7 .1 1 4 5 .5 1 4 9 .1 1 8 2 .5 1 5 5 .4 2 5 7 .4 4 7 0 .1
C o l t o n .............................................................................................. 1 A 1 A P 4 9 .1 4 9 .3 4 7 .5 4 0 1 3 1 .7 2 3 .7 1 8 .8 1 5 .1
O th e r ,  i n c l u d i n g  a d j u s t m e n t s ..................................... . 1 A A  Y 7 0 S 5 6 .8 5 0 .0 4 1 .6 3 0 .3 1 6 .3 4 .1 - 1 6 . 0
M e r c h a n d i s e :  i m p o r t s  f o  b ................................................ . 1 A  n  Z — 1 7 8 .3 - 2 4 7 . 0 1 5 8 .3 - 1 4 7 . 2 - 1 9 6 . 5 - 1 8 8  1 - 1 7 9 .1 - 3 1 4  0
T r a d e  b a la n c e ..................................................................... I A . C Z 8.3 3 - 3  8 8 4 .7 8 3 .6 4 8 .0 7 .3 1 0 1 .2 1 5 5 .2
O t h e r  g o o d s ,  s e r v ic e s ,  a n d  in c o m e :  c r e d i t  ........ . 1 S A Z. 3 5  5 4 0  1 2 5 .5 1 2 .8 1 1 .4 12 0 1 0 .5 7 .1
O t h e r  g o o d s ,  s e r v ic e s ,  a n d  in c o m e :  d e b i t ........... . i s  . n z - 9 3 .1 - 1 1 7 0 - 8 9 . 7 - 5 9 , 2 - 7 8 . 4 - 7 5 . 9 - 7 6 .1 - 1 0 1 . 7
S h i p m e n t  a n d  o t h e r  t r a n s p o r ta t i o n ........................ . i p n  z - 3 6 . ) - 4 9 4 - 4 3 . 9 - 2 5 . 5 - 3 5 . 2 - 3 8  4 - 3 0 . 4 - 5 1 . 7
I n v e s t m e n t  i n c o m e .............................................................. . 1 N  B z - I S O - 2 5 . 5 - 1 7 . 7 - 1 5 . 4 - 1 6 . 9 - 6 . 5 - 8 . 4 - 1 2 . 2
O t h e r .................................................................................................. . i s  n  y - 3  ft. 8 - 4 2 . 1 - 2 8 . 1 - 1 8 . 3 - 2 6  3 - 3 1 0 - 3 7 . 3 - 3 7 . 8
T o t a l :  g o o d s ,  s e r v ic e s ,  a n d  i n c o m e .............. . 1 . I C Z 2 5 .7 - 8 0 . 7 2 0 .5 3 7 .2 - 1 9 . 0 - 5 6  6 3 5 .6 6 0 6
P r iv a t e  u n r e q u i t e d  t r a n s f e r s  ........................................... . 1 K C Z - 6 . 9 - 7 . 4 - 8 . 3 - 3 . 3 - 4 . 2 - 2 . 8 - 4 . 9 - 4  0
T o t a l ,  e x c l .  o f f ic ia l  u n r e q u i t e d  t r a n s f e r s . . . 1 2 C  Z 1 8 .8 - 8 8  1 1 2 .2 3 3 .9 - 2 3 . 2 - 5 9  4 3 0 .7 5 6 .6
O f f ic ia l  u n r e q u i t e d  t r a n s f e r s  ........................................... . 1 H A C Z 1 .5 2 .6 2 .9 2 .2 3 2 1 3 .2 6 .7 1 .7
B . D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  a n d  O t h e r  lx > n g -T c r m
C a p i t a l ,  e x c l .  G r o u p s  F  t h r o u g h  H  ................... . t w  1 x  z 6 .6 3 0 .9 2 4 .3 - 1 2 . 4 1 1 .5 4 .8 - 1 3 . 9 - 1 7 . 6
D ir e c t  in v e s t m e n t  ..................................................................... . 3 Z  X  Z 4 .2 - 1 . 2 - 1 1 . 0 4  4 1 .4 1 .7 1 .0 .7
P o r t f o l i o  i n v e s t m e n t  .............................................................. 6  Z X  Z — — — 5 .7 — — —
O t h e r  lo n g - t e r m  c a p i t a l
R e s id e n t  o f f ic ia l  s e c t o r  ................................................. I W G X Z 1 6 .3 3 2 .4 3 4 .6 .3 9 .7 5 .3 - 5 . 8 - 4 . 9
L o a n s  r e c e i v e d  b y  g e n e r a !  g o v e r n m e n t ........ .. 7 P X  Y IS . 5 2 6 .3 2 0 .8 2 .5 1 3 .3 8 .3 - 4 . 1 - 2 . 3
O t h e r ......................................................................................... .. 1 W G X Y .8 6 .1 1 3 .8 - 2  2 - 3 . 6 - 3 . 0 - 1 . 7 - 2 . 6
D e p o s i t  m o n e y  b a n k s  ................................................... .. 5 Z  A X Z — — — — — — — —
O th e r  s e c t o r s  .......................................................................... . S Z A X Z - 1 3 . 9 - . 3 .7 - 2 2 . 8 4 - 2 . 2 - 9 .1 - 1 3  4
T o t a l ,  G r o u p s  A  p lu s  B ......................................... .. 1 B X Z 2 6 .9 - 5 4 , 6 3 9 .4 2 3 .7 - 8 . 5 - 4 1 . 4 2 3 .5 4 0 .7
C . O t h e r  S h o r t - T e r m  C a p i t a l ,  e x c l .  G r o u p s  F
th r o u g h  H  ...................................................................................... 1 W 3 X Z - 2 . 5 6 .8 1.1 - . 9 - 4 . 1 - 1 0 . 9 —.8 - 5 . 8
R e s id e n t  o f f ic ia l  s e c t o r  ...................................................... .. I W t I X Z - 1 . 2 1 .3 - . 3 - 1 3 - 4 . 3 - 1 . 5 1 0 1.5
D e p o s i t  m o n e y  h a n k s  ......................................................... 5 Z B X 7 . — 4  6 2 4 - 1  4 -  4 - 6  6 -  6 - 7 . 8
O t h e r  s e c t o r s ................................................................................ , S Z B X Z - 1 . 3 .9 - 1 . 0 1 .8 6 - 2 . 8 - 1 . 2 .5
D .  N e t  E r r o r s  a n d  O m i s s io n s  ............................................. .. 9 A  X Z - 2 6 . 0 3 .4 - 4 1 . 2 - 3 0 . 0 - 2 0 . 0 2 9 .6 - 2 3 . 1 - 1 3 . 3
T o t a l ,  G r o u p s  A  th r o u g h  D  ............................. . 1  F X Z - 1 . 6 - 4 4 . 4 - . 7 - 7 . 2 - 3 2 . 6 - 2 2 . 7 - . 4 2 1 .6
E . C o u n t e r p a r t  I t e m s  ................................................................. .. 7 B  X Z 5 .4 4 .3 4 .2 — — — — —
M o n e t i z a t i o n /d e m o n e t i z a t i o n  o f  g o ld  ................ . 9 B  3 X Z — — — — — — — —
A l l o c a t i o n / c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  S D R s  ............................. . 9 B 1 X Z 5 .4 4 .3 4 .2 — — — — —
V a lu a t io n  c h a n g e s  in  r e s e r v e s ...................................... S B  2 X Z
T o t a l ,  G r o u p s  A  th r o u g h  E ................................ .. 1 G  X Z 3 .8 - 4 0 . 1 3 .5 - 7 . 2 - 3 2 . 6 - 2 2 . 7 - . 4 2 1 .6
F . E x c e p t i o n a l  F i n a n c i n g ....................................................... . . .  I W Z X Z — — 4. 8 — 1 7 .5 2 3 .1 2 .4 - 2 1 . 1
D r a w i n g s  o n  l o a n s  r e c e iv e d  b y  B a n k  o f
U g a n d a ........................................................................................... 4 Q  W Z — — 4  8 — — — — —
P a y m e n t s  a r r e a r s ..................................................................... ... I X C X Z — — — — 17 5 2 3 .1 2 4 - 2 1 .1
T o t a l ,  G r o u p s  A  th r o u g h  F .............................. ... 1 . H X Z 3 .8 - 4 0 . 1 8 .3 - 7 . 2 - 1 5 . 1 .4 2 .0 .5
G . L ia b i l i t i e s  C o n s t i t u t i n g  F o r e ig n  A u t h o r i t i e s ’
R e s e r v e s ...................................................................................... ... 2 N  X  Z — — — — — — —
T o t a l ,  G r o u p s  A  th r o u g h  G .............................. . . .  1 I X z 3 .8 - 4 0 . 1 8 .3 - 7 . 2 - 1 5 . 1 .4 2 .0 .5
H .  T o t a l  C h a n g e  in  R e s e r v e s .............................................. ... 2 H . X Z - 3 . 8 4 0 .1 - 8 . 3 7 .2 1 5 .1 - . 4 - 2 . 0 - . 5
M o n e t a r y  g o l d ........................................................................... . . .  2 A X Z — — — — — — — —
S D R s  ................................................................................................. ... 2 B X Z - 5 . 4 4 . 2 - 4  1 .2 8 .4 1 .8 2 .3 - 3 . 6
R e s e r v e  p o s i t io n  in  t h e  F u n d ..................................... ... 2 C  . X Z - 2 . 0 6 .5 — — — — — —
F o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  a s s e t s  ................................................. ... 2 D  X Z 3 .6 2 7 .8 - 4 . 2 7 0 1 .7 - 1 1 . 3 - 1 3 . 0 3 .1
O t h e r  c l a i m s ................................................................................. ... 2 F. X Z — — — — — — — —
U s e  o f  F u n d  c r e d i t  .............................................................. ... 2 M X Z — 1 0 0 — — 5 0 9 .1 8 .7 —
C o n v e r s io n  r a t e s :  U g a n d a  s h i l l i n g s  p e r  S D R R B 7. 7 . 1 4 2 9 7 .1 6 4 1 7 .7 5 5 1 8 .3 7 0 4 8 . 5 9 1 5 8 . 9 9 9 6 9 .6 6 0 6 9 .6 5 0 2
Source: IMF: The Balance of Payments, March 1979
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APPENDIX TABLE 5
UGANDA: CHANGES IN GDP GROWTH RATES AND
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, 1964-76
Date % Deviation From Mean GDP Growth Rate3
Changes in International 
Reserves % GDP*3
1964 + 2.2 -0. 8
1965 + 1.9 +0.4
1966 + 2.3 +2.4
1967 + 0.2 +1.1
1968 +0. 3 +1.2
1969 + 7.8 +1.0
1970 -1.7 +0.4
1971 -0.9 -4.1
1972 +0.6 +0.9
1973 -4.4 -0.8
1974 -5.1 -1.8
1975 -5.4 +0.1
1976 -3.1 + 0. 3
Notes: a Mean GDP growth rate is 3.2. It is derived
from the growth rates of 5.3 and -0.3 for 
1960-70 and 1970-76, respectively, 
b The signs have been reversed so that now a 
positive (+) sign represents an addition 
to the reserve pool. Conversion of 
currency units to one common unit of GDP 
and international reserves has been done 
using exchange rates shown in Appendix Table 2.
Source: Computed by author using data from Table 1.1.
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APPENDIX TABLE 6
REAL GDP, CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, 
AND THEIR PROPORTIONS, 1961-76a
-1 bReal
^  ^ GDPDate
(Shs. Million)
cChanges
in International 
Reserves 
(Million SDRs)
_ d Changes
in International 
Reserves as % of 
Real GDP
1961 3660 -6. 7 + 1.3
1962 3688 + 5.6 -1.1
1963 4041 + 11.2 -2.0
1964 5510 + 5.9 -0.8
1965 5792 -3.6 +0.4
1966 6112 -20.9 + 2.4
1967 6296 -10.0 + 1.1
1968 6459 -10.6 + 1.2
1969 7171 -9.8 +1.0
1970 7268 -3.8 + 0.4
1971 7497 +40.1 -4.1
1972 7542 -8. 3 +0.9
1973 7496 + 7.2 -0. 8
1974 7509 +15.1 -1.8
1975 7347 -0.4 +0.1
1976 7321 -2.0 +0.3
1961-70 + 0.4
1971-76 -0.9
Notes: a
b
c
d
Conversion of GDP and international reserves 
to a common currency unit has been done using 
exchange rates shown in Appendix Table 2.
Real GDP is at factor cost in 1966 prices. 
1961-63 values were changed from 1960 prices 
to 1966 prices by author.
Values for 1961-69 are in Million US$.
The signs have been reversed so that now a 
positive (+) sign represents an addition to 
the reserve pool.
Source: Computed by author using data from Table 1.1,
Appendix Table 5, Table 2.23 and UN, Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics, 1970.
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Notes:
APPENDIX TABLE 7
RESULTS OF A REGRESSION OF CHANGES 
IN PRICES TO CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY 
AND INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS
Log AP = k>Q + AM + E
"k k k kLog AP = 2.1066 + 0.0224 AM + 0.3718 E 
(0.0059) (0.4845)
R 2 = 0.70
DW(d) =2.14 
n = 1 8
The data was extracted from Table 2.2. A constant was added to 
each number to rid the data of negative signs to enable a semi- 
logarithmic regression to be run.
AP = change in CPI
AM = change in money supply index
DW(d)= Durbin-Watson test (d)
E = Dummy variable for inflationary expectations:
E=0 for the period 1961-70 of no 
inflation, and E=1 for the period 
1971-78 of inflation.
* : The number of asterisks indicate the level of statistical
significance (of the t-ratio) of the regression coefficients;
* = 10%; * * = 5%; *** = 2.5%; **** = 1%.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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